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Abstract 
This thesis analyses three research questions on the Economics of crime 
using econometric techniques on panel level and individual level data 
sets in England and Wales. Chapter one focuses on the swiftness in the 
justice system and its effects on crime rates. Using a unique data set for 
court waiting times in days in England and Wales, and utilising a fixed 
effects model and instrumental variable approach, we find that effects 
vary on what type of crime it is. Chapters two and three explore how 
effective non-custodial sentences can be in reducing crime and 
reoffending rates. In particular, chapter two focuses on alternatives to 
custody on four different crime categories and chapter three uses 
individual level data and analyses the effects of Community Resolution 
on the recidivism rates for first time, low level offenders. The analysis 
in chapter two on sentencing in England and Wales finds after 
controlling for socio-economic variables in each area, that alternatives 
to custody can be effective at reducing certain types of crime. Chapter 
three uses individual level data from Norfolk and Suffolk Police and 
finds that Community Resolution can significantly reduce reoffending 
rates and time to reoffending. 
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1. Introduction 
 
England and Wales have some of the highest incarceration rates in the 
developed world. Recent policy reforms have focused on developing 
alternatives to custody that offer credible protection for the public, and 
justice for victims of crime. In my three chapters I look into the 
effectiveness of the justice system in England and Wales, specifically 
into general deterrents, specific deterrents and the swiftness of the 
justice system. I try to contribute to the existing crime literature by 
exploring the effects of alternatives to custody to capture general 
deterrence using aggregate data and specific deterrence using individual 
level data. I also use aggregate data to analyse the effects of swiftness of 
the justice system across three crime types. My findings suggest that 
there are some credible alternatives to prison which can also prove to 
be very cost effective, that diverting away from the formal proceedings 
through the justice system for low level offenders where applicable can 
have a reducing effect on reoffending later on and that celerity of the 
justice system might work in a different direction to crime reduction 
than previous theory would suggest. 
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Many studies include detection and/or conviction rates to try to account 
for certainty of punishment. Some studies include sentencing measures 
to account for severity. Chapter one of this thesis makes a contribution 
to existing crime literature by also including court waiting times as a 
measure of swiftness in the justice system. From the classical 3c’ theory 
of crime deterrence we know that if we want justice system to be an 
effective deterrent, we need certain punishment, which is severe enough 
and delivered swiftly. If the waiting times (known as celerity in crime 
literature) – measured in average days in waiting between a crime being 
committed and conviction in court – would increase, how would that 
affect the behaviour of the offenders? If there is no or very little 
supervision whilst waiting for their day in court, people might commit 
more crimes anticipating that if they are sentenced they might not be 
able to commit crimes after sentencing. However, if whilst waiting there 
are bail conditions imposed and additional police supervision, that 
might incentivise the offender to avoid further offences due to higher 
chances of being caught. Therefore, the overall effect of celerity is likely 
to depend on the surrounding factors and I suggest in my proposed 
hypothesis that waiting for justice can have an ambiguous effect on 
crime rates and it would depend not only on the future discounting of 
the criminals but also how waiting time is being monitored by the police  
which in turn would affect the probability of detection for any crimes 
committed while waiting. 
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By using crime data from 41 police force areas in England and Wales 
from 1994 to 2008 as well as a number of socio-economic variables to 
control for other factors influencing crime rates in the region, I adopt a 
fixed effects estimation methodology and instrument crime detection 
rate with various lags of police expenditure per police officer to show 
that longer waiting times have mixed effects on crime rates depending 
on what type of crime it is. 
Chapter two analyses the effects of custodial and non-custodial 
sentences on police-recorded crime using a unique detailed panel-level 
data acquired from the Ministry of Justice through a Freedom of 
Information request for all Police Force Areas from 2002 to 2013 in 
England and Wales. This data set details the different sentences that 
have been issued for all crime types each year and allows one to 
distinguish between sentence types i.e. the number of prison sentences 
and non-custodial sentences such as community sentences, conditional 
discharge, fines and suspended sentences. The results from the 
empirical analysis show that prison, in some circumstances, can be 
effective at reducing acquisitive crime, but that alternatives to custody 
are also effective in many cases. Although these findings are most 
directly applicable to England and Wales, they have relevance to a more 
general understanding of criminal justice effectiveness. 
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Chapter three uses individual level data collected by Norfolk and Suffolk 
Police on case disposals to analyse the effects of Community Resolution 
on reoffending. Community Resolution allows the police to make 
decisions about how to deal more proportionately with lower level 
crimes and it is focused at first time offenders who showed genuine 
remorse, and where the victim (if there is one) has agreed that the police 
do not take more formal action. Since reoffending rates remain high in 
the UK for both adult and juvenile offenders, it is important to 
understand what works well at a micro level. In particular, if Community 
Resolution is effective, this could lead to significant savings of the public 
funds by police spending less time and money on investigations and 
processing of low level offences which in turn would allow them to 
focus more on serious offences. Using Propensity Score Matching and 
Survival Analysis on four different time intervals to reoffend, we find 
that Community Resolution can significantly reduce reoffending rates 
and time to reoffending. 
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2. Is Justice delayed justice denied? Exploring the 
impact of sanction celerity on crime 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The determinants of crime and the effectiveness of crime reduction 
interventions are widely discussed by the public, politicians and academics. 
There is a fair amount of variance in what people believe to be the reasons for 
criminal behaviour and most importantly the best crime reduction 
approaches. There is a debate between those who believe law enforcement 
and criminal justice processing policies play a major role while others focus 
on so called root causes viz. socio economic conditions. Even within those 
who emphasise the role of law enforcement and criminal justice processing, 
there is debate on the relative importance of the different factors. Lengthy 
prison sentences and heavier fines are proposed by some, more efficient 
policing in terms of detection and conviction rates are the focus of others with 
waiting times for the sentencing to take place or better reoffending 
management highlighted by yet another group of scholars and practitioners. 
The theory of deterrence has developed from the work of three classical 
philosophers Hobbes, Beccaria and Bentham (Beccaria, 1764, Bentham, 1780, 
Hobbes, 1996). It relies on three components, also, called 3 Cs: Severity, 
Certainty and Celerity of the punishment. The severity of the punishment is 
believed to be one the key elements implemented by the criminal law to 
encourage citizens to obey the law. Also, certainty of that punishment implies 
that the punishment will take place if the crime is committed. Some theorists, 
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such as Beccaria, believe that if individuals know they will be punished in a 
case of committing a crime, they will refrain from committing those crimes in 
the future. Moreover, he argues that their punishment must be swift if one 
wants to deter the crime. To sum up the deterrence theorists believe that if 
punishment is severe, certain and swift, a rational individual will measure 
potential gains and losses before engaging in illegal activity and will be 
discouraged from breaking the law if the loss is greater than the gain. Although 
the deterrence theory can be traced down from centuries ago, it was not tested 
or empirically measured much until the late 1960s. Prior to the 1960s, most 
studies focused mainly on the philosophical ideas rather than on empirically 
testing the deterrence theory. 
 
Nowadays amongst policymakers there is a strong cross-party consensus that 
access to speedy justice is crucial both for reducing crime and satisfying the 
interests of victims. In the United Kingdom, New Labour, under the banner 
of Tony Blair’s (in)famous slogan, ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of 
crime’, made access to swift criminal justice a key policy priority (Morgan, 
2008). One influential government strategy document promised that ‘cases 
that need the court process will be dealt with fairly but as quickly as possible’ 
while also suggesting wider use of ‘summary’ procedures including dealing 
with cases just a day after initial charge (Home Office, 2004, 2006). Using 
remarkably similar language and rationale, the Coalition Government that 
followed New Labour proclaimed: ‘Justice needs to be swift if it is to be 
effective. Offenders need to be made to face the consequences of their actions 
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quickly, using effective, locally-based solutions.’ (Ministry of Justice, 2012) 
This intention to streamline the process bringing offenders to justice has 
continued under the current Conservative government (HM Treasury, 2015). 
  
In this chapter with the help of unique panel data on the average length of 
time between offence and conviction received from the United Kingdom’s 
Ministry of Justice through a Freedom of Information request, we contribute an 
additional perspective to this relatively neglected aspect of criminal justice 
practice and deterrence theory. We analyse the effect of length of time 
between a crime being committed and conviction in court. In line with 
previous research into celerity, we find the impact of different conviction 
times to be mixed. We suggest that this result is not because this factor is 
necessarily unimportant, but because the overall result emerges from an 
interplay between specific and general deterrent effects. We propose that 
where there is no or very little supervision while awaiting their day in court, 
people may commit more crime rationally anticipating that they might not be 
able to commit crimes after sentencing. However, delaying a sanction for a 
particular offender which allows for bail conditions to be imposed and 
additional police supervision incentivises that offender to avoid further 
offences at least while the sanction outcome is still to be determined. The 
overall effect of celerity is thus likely to depend critically on other factors 
including how effectively tendencies in sentencing is communicated to a 
general population (which contributes to a general deterrent effect), when a 
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decision to commit an offence is a rational calculation by the offender and 
also depends on the (level of) certainty of detection. 
2.2 The theory 
 
Hobbes (1996) was among the first theorists to introduce the notion that 
conflict over resources could arise between rational self-interested individuals. 
Since those in conflict respond to incentives, a state with sufficient legitimacy 
could deter potential rebels against the peace, provide civil order, and protect 
productive activities such as commerce. Beccaria refined this account by 
introducing three components of punishment, sometimes given the moniker 
‘the 3 Cs’, Severity, Certainty and Celerity (Nagin, 2013). Beccaria believed that 
if individuals expect to pay a greater penalty for committing a crime than not 
committing it, they will refrain.  As a result, he was also an early advocate for 
criminal justice reform, arguing against torture and secret accusations not just 
in reaction to their inhumanity but because they failed to establish rational 
expectation among those subject to the laws, and hence were ineffective at 
controlling crime (Paternoster, 2010). Beccaria also introduced the notion of 
marginal deterrence, stating that “If an equal punishment be ordained for two 
crimes that injure society in different degrees, there is nothing to deter men 
from committing the greater as often as it is attended with greater advantage”.  
 
Bentham, drawing inspiration from Beccaria, linked this account to his theory 
of utilitarianism and thus eventually to modern economic theory. He argued 
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that the object of law was to maximise the happiness of the people by 
increasing their pleasure and lessening their pain. As a result, he argued that 
punishment in excess of what is essential to deter people from committing 
illegal acts is unjustified.  All these theorists believed that if punishment is 
sufficiently severe, certain and swift, a rational individual will measure 
potential gains and losses before engaging in illegal activity and will be 
discouraged from breaking the law if the loss is greater than the gain. 
  
Strangely, the celerity aspect of deterrence lost its place amongst the ‘three Cs’ 
when deterrence was imported into contemporary economic theory (Nagin, 
2013). Becker (1968) first applied formal economic analysis to crime in his 
famous crime and punishment model. In his model, the cost of the criminal 
act includes the probability of getting caught and the severity of the 
punishment. He proposed that an individual chooses an illegal activity over a 
legal one if his or her utility from illegal activity exceeds the utility from the 
legal one: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖 >  𝐸𝑈𝑙  
where 𝐸𝑈𝑖 is expected utility from illegal sector and 𝐸𝑈𝑙  is expected utility 
from the legal sector. Then we can define 𝐸𝑈𝑖 as: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝐸𝑈(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒) + 𝑝 ∗ 𝐸𝑈(𝑆) 
where 𝐸𝑈(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒) is expected utility from criminal activities, 𝐸𝑈(𝑆) is 
expected utility from sentence if individual is caught which comes with a 
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probability p. This simple form of Becker’s crime model states that an 
individual will choose illegal sector only if his utility from illegal activities is 
higher than from his expected returns from legal sector. Following this model, 
we can see that both certainty and severity of the punishment should affect 
the crime rates negatively: 
𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑝
=  −𝐸𝑈(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒) + 𝐸𝑈(𝑆) < 0 
𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑆
=  −𝑝𝐸𝑈′ (𝑆) < 0 
However, we can extend this model including celerity. In other words, in a 
case where detection has occurred, we can look at how long would an 
individual have to wait for the punishment to be announced. Simple temporal 
discounting would suggest that the longer the waiting time between crime and 
punishment, the less strong the deterrent of the potential punishment. Hence, 
greater celerity would be expected to reduce crime. This is true, when we 
extend the model to look at those who are caught and conditional on being 
expected to be sentenced and hence face lower payoffs post-conviction from 
legal opportunities (convicted people face lower probability of employment 
in the legal sector). However, waiting times have ambiguous effects if 
supervision, while waiting for trial, lowers their crime opportunity. 
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2.3 Empirical literature 
 
Becker’s revival of deterrence theory inspired a broad range of empirical 
studies. One prediction of Becker’s model is that increasing the severity of 
punishment could act as a substitute for certainty of detection. However, 
empirical observation suggests that different elements of deterrence have 
different effects. Certainty of punishment has been the most explored area 
and there is now a relatively strong consensus that increasing the likelihood 
of apprehension reduces crime (Von Hirsch et al., 1999, Bailey et al., 1974).  
In the United Kingdom, a number of researchers have used at the level of 
police force areas (PFAs) to develop panel data analyses. Witt et al. (1999) 
linked increasing wage inequality and more cars per capita with higher crime, 
but also found that a larger police force was associated with lower property 
crime. Machin and Meghir (2004) found that fewer opportunities for low-
wage work were associated with higher acquisitive crime, and also found that 
potential offenders are deterred by higher conviction rates.  Han et al. (2013) 
found a strong relationship between higher police detection rates and lower 
crime rates in subsequent years. Another panel study of Greek regions 
(Saridakis and Spengler, 2012) found that property crime was deterred by 
higher clear-up rates and reduced by lower unemployment, but these effects 
were generally insignificant for violent crime. 
 
In the United States, several panel studies have been used to explore the 
effects of incarceration on crime rates (Durlauf and Nagin, 2010). The results 
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were inconsistent, with only some studies suggesting that prison population 
growth had a small deterrent effect. Vieratis et al. (2007) combined panel data 
of prison growth and prisoner releases. They found that prison growth was 
associated with lower crime but that releasing prisoners was associated with 
higher crime, an effect they attributed to the criminogenic effects of 
incarceration. This suggests that the crime reduction effect of more 
incarceration can be short-lived, and that use of prison might be a double-
edged sword that can easily prove counter-productive. A panel study 
comparing justice systems in German states (Spengler, 2006) found that 
higher conviction rates were associated with lower crime rates but not the 
form, or severity, of sanction. Spelman (2013) offered a more sophisticated 
solution to disentangling the co-dependence of crime and prisons, by finding 
instruments for crime that predict changes in prison population, before 
deriving the effects of prison on crime. His results suggest that increased use 
of prison was, on balance, crime reductive in the US. More recently, Bhuller 
et al (2016) explored effects imprisonment on recidivism with a focus on 
rehabilitation and further employment using a panel data containing the 
criminal behaviour and labour market outcomes of the entire population in 
Norway. They find that time spent in prison can reduce future offending if 
there is focus on rehabilitation improving employability which ultimately 
raises employment and earnings and discourages from further involvement in 
criminal activities. 
 
13 
 
Research designs that examine the effect of sanction on individual offenders 
offer a different perspective, one potentially much more critical of increasing 
sanction severity. An array of randomised controlled trials (RCT) have 
examined the effects of short periods of custody on offenders compared to 
alternative sentences (Killias and Villetaz, 2008). The results are not 
conclusive but suggest that prison for low-level offenders might have a small 
criminogenic effect. Existing offender characteristics were much larger 
predictors of criminal career prospects. RCTs have arguably the highest levels 
of internal validity. However, there are questions about how far these results 
can be extrapolated to a general population of offenders. It is rare that justice 
systems can permit random selection of sanctions. When they do, the 
offenders studied are necessarily low-level, as they have to be eligible for a 
community disposal. Comparatively small numbers of offenders are included 
in these studies with the result that real but relatively small effects might be 
hard to detect with certainty. 
 
Smith et al. (2002) reviewed studies which compared the effects of community 
sentences with custodial sentences. They restricted their survey to those with 
study designs which controlled for offender characteristics and found 31 
eligible studies. A small effect suggesting that prison sentences might be 
associated with increased recidivism was found. They concluded that 
variations in the kind of sentence ‘did not produce decreases in recidivism’ 
although they did find ‘tentative indications that increasing lengths of 
incarceration were associated with slightly greater increases in recidivism’. 
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Nieuwbeerta et al. (2009) identified the effects of first-time incarceration on 
individual offenders. They used risk-matching to control for individual 
differences between offenders given custodial sentences compared with 
alternatives. They examined criminal activity 3 years following the different 
judicial interventions, and concluded that being incarcerated had a 
criminogenic effect, putting offenders on a more serious criminal career path. 
These matching approaches have become successively more effective at 
estimating the impact of differential sentencing on individual offenders, 
including long term impacts on criminal career trajectories. They suggest, in 
contrast to the modest reductions in crime associated with increased 
incarceration in panel data, that harsher penalties potentially increase crime. 
 
Kessler and Levitt (1999) tested the model using California’s Proposition 8 
which allowed for imposing sentence enhancements for a selected number of 
crimes. In their paper they demonstrated that these sentence enhancements 
which are increases in punishment added on to prison sentences, which would 
have been served anyway, provide a direct means of measuring deterrence (in 
the population). Any changes in crime rate after these enhancements must be 
due to deterrence because offenders would have been sent to prison anyway 
so there would be no additional incapacitation effect from the sentence 
enhancement in the short run. They found that three years after the law was 
introduced, selected crimes have decreased by 20 - 40 per cent compared to 
non-eligible crimes. 
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Bandyopadhyay et al (2012) analysed the impact of sentencing on various 
types of crimes in England and Wales. Using data from 1993 to 2008 from all 
43 Police Force Areas they found that detection has a negative and significant 
effect on all crime types analysed and the impact of sentences is negative and 
significant for only burglary and fraud. 
 
While the evidence for the effect of certainty is strong, and the impact of 
severity ambiguous, the evidence on celerity is ‘scant’ (Nagin and Pogarsky, 
2011). This is despite existing evidence that time preference exerts a critical 
influence, at least, on the way that offenders weight severity in terms of length 
of prison sentences themselves (Lee and McCrary, 2005).  A cross-sectional 
analysis explored the popular hypothesis that delayed executions for homicide 
in the United States blunted the deterrent effect of the death penalty but found 
no significant effects (Bailey, 1980). A somewhat dated review of the evidence, 
of mostly laboratory experimental studies, found celerity to contribute to 
deterrence but not one when intervening variables were included (Clark, 
1988). More recent experimental studies asked potential offenders about 
crime and punishment scenarios, focussed on decisions to engage in drink 
driving (Loughran et al., 2012, Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001). These studies 
suggest that anticipated celerity of sanction does influence potential offenders. 
However, another study of a random sample of drink driving cases processed 
in New York state found no effect from celerity (Yu, 1994).  A more recent 
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study used arrest data from Dallas, Texas, to study a much wider range of 
defendants using Propensity Score Matching method, finding that celerity of 
arrest was associated with significantly less recidivism (Zettler et al., 2015), 
although the impact of celerity diminished after 30 days. To the best of our 
knowledge, no study before the present one has integrated measures of 
celerity of conviction into a panel data analysis. 
 
2.4 Discussion: Specific, general and prospective deterrence  
 
A general deterrent effect is not simply an aggregation of specific deterrent 
activities. What makes a deterrent general is the influence it has on a whole 
population of potential offenders, not only those who are caught and 
convicted. If we assume perfect information, past personal experience of 
punishment should not influence an individual agent’s decision to commit 
crime in the future. Sanctioned agents are already fully aware of the risk of 
punishment and, when caught, have not so much miscalculated their decision 
to engage in crime, but are merely unfortunate to get caught on that occasion. 
In this rarefied model, increased sanctions that increase the ‘price’ of engaging 
in crime have only a general deterrent impact: shifting the supply of crimes to 
a new lower equilibrium. The fact that individuals are caught and punished 
reflects that the price (of being caught and sentenced) is still perceived to be 
a fair bargain by some offenders and they still make a decision to engage in 
criminal activities. 
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In a more realistic scenario, potential offenders are not perfectly informed. In 
this context, specific deterrence plays fundamentally an informational or 
signalling role. It can reveal new information to offenders that they will, in 
fact, be caught and suffer additional penalties if they do not desist (Apel, 
2013). Besides acting on the individual punished, the existence of social 
networks amongst criminal peers means that knowledge about the likelihood 
and severity of punishment can spread, albeit unsystematically, to other 
potential offenders (Dickinson and Wright, 2015). In the case of joint criminal 
enterprises, giving some potential offenders specific, prospective sanctions is 
associated with lower crime amongst their peers (Drago and Galbiati, 2012). 
   
However, this learning process can also have unfortunate side-effects. An 
offender might perversely conclude that the penalty (for example, 
experiencing a community sentence or a brief prison term) was not as 
unpleasant as they previously expected. Their updated expectations could 
encourage them to commit more rather than less crime. At the same time, 
experience in prison may have encouraged them to build up criminal capital 
and lose social capital, making them ‘better’ criminals but less likely to find 
work in the legitimate economy. At the same, the process of socialisation, 
especially in harsh prison conditions, can make re-integration into society less 
likely (Drago et al., 2011). 
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On the other hand, we would expect the credible prospect of a future sanction 
to have a deterrent effect without some of these side-effects. Indeed, a 
number of empirical studies have identified significant behavioural effects of 
prospective sanctions. Drago et al. (2009) exploit a mass pardon in the Italian 
prison system which introduced a number of exogenous changes to a cohort 
of prisoners. They found that prisoners pardoned early, and so eligible for a 
longer sentence if reconvicted were significantly less likely to re-offend. They 
concluded that the prospect of prison deterred subsequent crime. The 
potential weakness to this particular analysis is that the prospect of a longer 
sentence is reverse correlated with the length of the sentence served so far 
(Durlauf and Nagin, 2010). This means that it is impossible to say from this 
method alone whether the lower level of observed offending is due to less 
prison experienced already or the prospect of more prison in the future. 
However, another study exploited variation in New South Wales’ ‘good 
behaviour bonds’ to show that offenders given longer periods in which the 
prospect of a specific penalty remains leads to lower re-offending (Poynton et 
al., 2014). Special drug courts have also exploited the opportunity to suspend 
the imposition of a formal criminal sanction in combination with increased 
supervision, although with ambiguous results (Sherman, 2012, Belenko et al., 
1994). 
  
We believe, it is the existence of prospective sanctions that mediates the 
impact of celerity in the context of criminal justice in England and Wales. If 
an individual has been arrested and is waiting for the court conviction and 
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sentencing while in the community on bail, it might mean that they can be 
more closely monitored and the sanction for the previous offence has yet to 
be determined. The government explains bail as follows: “You can be released 
on bail at the police station after you’ve been charged. This means you will be 
able to go home until your court hearing. If you are given bail, you might have 
to agree to conditions like: 
• living at a particular address 
• not contacting certain people 
• giving your passport to the police so you can’t leave the UK 
• reporting to a police station at agreed times, e.g. once a week 
Failure to comply with these conditions leads to another arrest and remand in 
custody before the court hearing.”1  
 
This suggests that monitoring is indeed stricter once someone is out on a bail 
and longer waiting times would increase crimes rates only for the crimes where 
detection and probability of getting caught is low. If there are no bail 
restrictions and probability of being caught again is low (detection rates across 
crime types can vary by a lot), offender waiting for the punishment can 
anticipate that they will be able to commit less crime after the sentence is 
announced and they might commit more crimes whilst waiting. At the same 
                                                             
1 Taken from https://www.gov.uk/charged-crime/bail  
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time, one can argue that probability of getting caught p would increase while 
one is waiting for the punishment to be announced via various monitoring 
methods such as restricted hours when the offender must be at home or 
reporting to police officers. Therefore, one could argue that celerity effect on 
crime rates is not that straightforward and can have different effects after you 
condition on the detection rates. Tittle (1969) found support for the 
deterrence theory and concluded that the certainty of imprisonment deters 
crime, however, the severity can only deter crime when certainty of the 
punishment is reasonably high. In this paper we want to test if the same 
hypothesis would hold for the celerity as well. 
 
The proposed hypothesis we are trying to answer in this paper would be as 
follows: 
Waiting for justice can have an ambiguous result on crime rates and it would depend not 
only on future discounting of the criminals but also how the accused during waiting time is 
being monitored by the police which in turn would affect probability of detection for any 
crimes committed while waiting. In other words, more serious crimes such as violent crimes, 
which have higher detection rate, could have a negative effect on crime rates when waiting 
time is increased and economic crime such as theft, which have a lower detection rate and 
lowered monitoring, could have a positive effect on crime rates when waiting time is increased. 
 
The existing literature tries to establish different relationships between crime 
and crime determinants including the impact of various socio-economic 
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variables. Although there is a massive literature on this in the U.S. there has 
also been a growing number of European and UK studies on crime 
determinants (see Reilly and Witt (1992), Pyle and Deadman (1994), Witt et 
al. (1998), Machin and Meghir (2004), Carmichael and Ward (2001), Edmark 
(2003), Han et al. (2013)). These studies have tested and shown that policing, 
i.e. detection and conviction rates, as well as socio-economic variables such as 
higher presence of young people in the community, income and income 
inequality, unemployment and population density can affect crimes in 
different ways. This paper contributes to existing literature by exploring crime 
determinants while including all three variables from classic crime deterrence 
theory – Certainty, Severity and Celerity. Also, it used three crime types – 
theft, burglary and violence against the person to check how waiting times, or 
Celerity, might be affecting them differently through possible increase in 
detection while waiting for justice.  
 
In this paper we use a data from 41 Police Forces2 from England and Wales 
from 1994 to 2008 to test the deterrence theory on the 3 Cs – Severity, 
Certainty and Celerity and how they affect different crime rates. We also 
include a set of control variables such as proportion of young people, 
population density and lower quartile earnings. We use a fixed effects model 
to eliminate the unobserved characteristics at police area levels from the 
                                                             
2 There are 43 Police Forces in England and Wales, however, the data on Celerity (Waiting 
times measured in number of days) for City of London is not separated into City and 
Metropolitan Police District, hence, we had to exclude London City and Metropolitan Police. 
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estimated coefficients. Moreover, we include a dummy for the year 1997 and 
beyond due to a change in crime counting in England and Wales. To 
overcome a potential endogeneity of police detection (as one could argue that 
whilst detection rate can affect crime rate, at the same time crime rates can 
affect detection rates – if crime rates increases, then less resources would be 
spent per crime investigation which could lead to lower detection rates as a 
result which would mean that police detection could be inversely correlated 
with crime), we use an Instrumental Variable approach. We instrument 
detection rate with lagged detection and various lags of police expenditure 
which is not correlated with crime rates – funding to police forces is not 
dependent on crime rate in the force area, hence, we find it to be a suitable 
instrument for detection rate3. To ensure that our chosen instruments are 
suitable, we test for the validity and the strength and conclude that the chosen 
instruments are indeed valid and not weak for all cases. 
 
2.5 Data Description 
 
To conduct our analysis, we use data from 41 Police Force Areas (PFAs) in 
England and Wales covering the period 1994-2008. The dependent variables 
in this paper are crime rates for burglary, theft and violence against the person 
which are expressed as number of offences per 1000 people in each PFA 
yearly.  The first two offence types are categorised as property or economic 
                                                             
3 Machin and Meghir (2004) also use police expenditure as an instrument for detection 
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crime type while the last one is a non-economic crime type. The crime rate 
data are available from Criminal Statistics and Crime in England and Wales 
published by Home Office. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all crime 
types averaged over the 1994-2008 period.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Burglary rate 15.62 7.73 
Theft rate 37.18 11.17 
Violence Against the Person 11.24 6.12 
   
All crime types are defined as the number of offences per 1000 population 
There is total of 574 PFA – year observations (41 PFA by 14 years) in the sample 
 
For explanatory variables, we use detection rate to represent the certainty of 
the punishment. The lower the detection rate is, the lower the certainty of the 
punishment would be. Detection rate is measured by the proportion of total 
recorded criminal offences which had been detected. Detection rates are 
available for all three crime types we are analysing and are obtained from the 
Home Office Publication series Criminal Statistics and Crime in England and 
Wales. Data on detection rates are available yearly at the PFA level. We would 
expect a negative sign between detection rates and crime rates. If detection 
rates increase, expected gain from the criminal activity decreases as probability 
of getting caught p goes up. 
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We use average sentence to reflect the severity of the punishment which is 
measured by the average time (given in months) offenders were sentenced to 
custody. This does not necessarily show the real time spent in the prison but 
it reflects the Severity of the punishment in our analysis. As with detection, 
average sentence data are available on all crime types and is available yearly at 
the PFA level. Data were received from the Ministry of Justice following a 
Freedom of Information request. Many would expect that longer prison sentence 
should negatively affect the crime rates. Firstly, harsher potential sentence 
might discourage criminals from committing an offence. Secondly, if criminals 
are held in prison for longer they have less time to commit crimes outside the 
prison. However, spending longer time in prison away from family and 
employment can affect future personal and financial circumstances in a 
negative way. People facing lower employment opportunities after prison 
might turn back to criminal activities due to economic reasons.  Prisons may 
also lead to interaction with criminals and access to networks, increasing 
future crime opportunities. Therefore, we can expect the relationship between 
sentencing and crime rates to be either positive or negative. 
 
We use the number of days on average an offender had to wait from offence 
to completion stage of proceeding as our variable representing the swiftness 
of the justice system. We call it the waiting times variable. It is available yearly 
at the PFA level and was also obtained from the Ministry of Justice through a 
Freedom of Information request detailing how many days on average 
offenders had to wait from offence to completion stage of proceeding. Theory 
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suggests that shorter waiting times should be associated with a lower crime 
rate as the swiftness of the justice system is a positive crime deterrent. 
However, we argue that the effect can be ambiguous and some type of 
offences can result with a stricter bail conditions and/or some offenders 
might not want to risk being caught again while waiting for the completion 
stage of proceeding in fear that the sentence given to them then would be 
harsher.  
We include a number of socio-economic variables as controls which are 
widely used in other crime studies: 
Youth is defined as the proportion of people aged 15 to 24 of the whole 
population in each PFA.  Data are available from the Office for National 
Statistics at the local authority level and had been aggregated to PFAs 
according to each PFA’s geographic boundaries. It was obtained by 
aggregating two age groups of people aged 15 to 19 and 20 to 24. The reason 
we include proportion of youth in the population is due to the wide belief that 
young people commit more crimes. Youth Justice Statistics by the Ministry of 
Justice reports that in 2012 – 2013 there were 1.07 million arrests for notifiable 
offences in England and Wales, of which 126,809 were of people aged 10 – 
18 years. That accounted for 11.8 per cent of all the arrests while all 10-17 
year olds account for 10.5 per cent of the total population of those ages 10 or 
above (people of offending age) in England and Wales. Young adults aged 18 
to 25 make up 10% of total population, however they account for a third of 
those sent to prison each year (Prison Reform Tryst, 2012). This could be 
explained by the lower opportunity cost of committing crime for young 
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offenders. First of all, young people tend to have lower earnings, therefore, if 
they were caught, they would lose less financially than someone older with 
higher wages. Second of all, juvenile offenders tend to get more lenient 
punishments for committed offences. For those reasons, a higher proportion 
of young people in the population could be associated with higher crime rates. 
However, young people could also be deterred from committing crimes due 
to possible negative outcomes on their future labour market opportunities. 
Therefore, we can expect either a negative or a positive sign between crime 
rates and youth population in the PFA. 
 
We use lower quartile earnings coefficient to account for income inequality 
across England and Wales as this data are available yearly at the PFA level 
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. It can be argued that the 
increase in the lower quartile earnings could affect crime rates negatively due 
to less economic incentive to commit a crime with increases in income 
(Machin and Meghir, 2004).  
 
Population density is measured as population per square kilometre. Data are 
available from Criminal Statistics and Crime in England and Wales published 
by the Home Office. It is available yearly at the PFA level.  The effect of the 
population density on crime could be ambiguous – more densely populated 
areas could have higher crime rates due to more opportunities for crime to 
take place (more people, more vehicles, more goods to be stolen), however, 
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with more people being around the offender might be easily seen by witnesses 
and the police are more likely to respond quicker than in a less populated area.  
 
Descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables averaged for 1994 – 2008 
period, are reported in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory 
variables 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Detection rate - burglary 17.14 7.39 
Detection rate – theft 22.03 6.56 
Detection rate – violence against the person 67.94 15.7 
   
Average sentence – burglary 15.66 2.75 
Average sentence – theft 4.92 1.3 
Average sentence - violence against the person  16.91 2.19 
   
Waiting times – burglary  126.33 30.85 
Waiting times – theft  104.4 22.62 
Waiting times - violence against the person 119.84 22.57 
   
Youth 12.29 1.12 
Q25 1.71 0.18 
Population Density 423.95 406.03 
 
2.6 Econometric Specification 
 
We start our methodological analysis by looking at the simple linear crime 
function where crime rate is determined by 3 Cs – Detection which is used for 
the Certainty, Average Sentence which is reflects Severity and Waiting Times 
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which are used for the Celerity and various socio-economic variables. Our 
proposed empirical model is 
 
Crimei,t = β1Certaintyi,t-1 + β2Severityi,t-1 + β3Celerityi,t-1,t + β4Youthi,t + 
β5Q25Earningsi,t + β6PopulationDensityi,t  + Dummy+  σi + εi,t 
(1) 
where i represents the Police Force Authority, t represents time, σ
i 
is the 
unknown intercept for each PFA, and ε
i,t
 is the error term. Crime stands for 
the crime rate per 1000 people, Certainty stands for the detection rate, Severity 
stands for the average sentence issued in months, Celerity stands for the 
average waiting time from the offence to completion stage of  proceeding in 
days4, Youth stands for the proportion of  young population aged 15 to 24, 
Q25Earnings stands for the lower quartile earnings coefficient and 
PopulationDensity stands for the Population Density in each PFA.    We also 
include a dummy variable since there was a change in counting rule in 1998 
April. Prior the change, crime was counted from 1 January till 31 December 
and after the change it was started to count from 1 April to 31 March next 
year making it coincide with the financial year. Also, some definitions of  crime 
types have been broadened which led to upward shifts in crime rates since 
1998. The dummy variable has a value of  one for the post change periods and 
zero otherwise. Also, since there is an overall positive trend for violence 
                                                             
4 In Appendix A.2 we also report Tables 30 and 31 where we estimate the same model and 
report the results when we drop (i) Celerity and (ii) Severity. 
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against the person rate and overall negative trend for theft and burglary rates 
(Appendix A.1) we include a time trend in our model. All variables (apart from 
time trend and dummy) are in natural logarithms to make interpretation easier 
in elasticity form. Also, for detection, average sentence and waiting times 
variables we use lagged values. There are two reasons why we believe they 
have to be lagged: theoretically, the offender’s perception of  risk and 
punishment (whether it is how likely they are to be caught, how swiftly they 
would be sentenced and how long they would spend in prison) will not 
instantly adapt to reality but more gradually and, practically, there is some time 
delay from when convictions happen and when the crime was committed. 
Additionally, using lags reduce the problem with the potential reverse causality 
of  each of  these variables which depend on the number of  recorded crimes 
as we explain in more detail below. 
 
We start by estimating a fixed effects model which eliminates unobserved area 
specific time invariant effects and then we employ an Instrumental Variable 
approach (IV) fixed effects model to overcome potential issue with 
endogeneity of  detection rate. If  crime rate and detection rate are endogenous 
we would get inconsistent results with our estimation since detection rate 
would be associated not only with changes in crime rate but also with changes 
in the error term. Therefore, finding a suitable instrument which would be 
correlated with detection but not directly affect crime rate, can help us 
overcome potentially inconsistent estimates. It could be argued that whilst 
detection rate can affect crime rate, at the same time crime rates can influence 
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detection rates – if  crime rates go up, then fewer resources would be spent 
per crime investigation which in turn can lead to lower detection rates as a 
result. In that case we would be capturing a spurious relationship between 
detection and crime rates. Therefore, we use an IV approach where the first 
lag of detection is being instrumented with other variables which are 
correlated with detection itself but are not correlated with crime rates. To 
instrument the first lag of detection we use second lag of detection for all 
crime types plus lagged police expenditure5. We believe that police 
expenditure is a suitable instrument because it is determined by a Police 
Allocation Formula which is not directly determined by crime rates reported 
in each PFA but is based on various socio-economic variables that helps to 
predict the workload for the forces. In order to test for instruments validity 
and strength, we perform appropriate tests. Firstly, to test for the validity we 
check if instrument passes Sargan’s and Basmann’s tests, secondly, to check 
whether instruments are weak we calculate the minimum eigenvalue statistic 
by Cragg and Donald and check it against Stock and Yogo weak instrument 
test critical values. All instruments passed both tests, therefore, we can be sure 
that our chosen instruments are valid and are not weak.  
 
One could similarly argue that when crime rates go up, sentencing and waiting 
times would be affected which would cause issues of potential endogeneity. 
As for sentencing, sentencing guidelines which are set by the Sentencing 
                                                             
5 For violence against the person we use the first lag of real police expenditure, for theft and 
burglary we use the third lag of real expenditure per police officer 
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Council for England and Wales help to ensure that all courts are consistent in 
their approach to sentencing. They provide guidance on factors that the court 
should take into account when deciding on a sentence which is the same 
across England and Wales. Therefore, we believe there should be no major 
issue with endogeneity for sentencing variable and as noted above we are using 
a lagged value for sentencing variable. Waiting times could be affected by the 
volume of crime reported as courts would have to deal with a larger number 
of hearings and that could in turn cause delays in how swiftly the crimes are 
resolved. However, there is a vast variation in average investigation and 
hearing times between different offences and importantly for guilty plea and 
not guilty plea trials. Furthermore, the biggest single reason accountable for a 
trial being recorded as ineffective (which means a delay and rescheduling for 
a future date when a trial could not take a place on a scheduled day) has been 
identified as court administration suggesting that waiting times are not only 
affected by crime numbers but also by how they are administered as a number 
of participants would then not attend a court and the absence of witnesses 
and defendants would prolong the process and increase waiting times 
(Rossetti, 2015). Also, as noted earlier we are using the first lag of waiting 
times variable to further reduce endogeneity.  
 
2.7 Results 
 
The empirical results are provided in the tables below. Table 3 gives results 
from the fixed effect model and Table 4 gives results using the Instrumental 
Variable Approach. 
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For the fixed effects model, the lagged detection rate is statistically significant 
at 1% level for all crime types. As expected it has a negative effect on crime 
rates, suggesting that when detection rates go up crime rates go down. A 1% 
increase in detection rate would lead to 0.29% decrease in theft, 0.17% 
decrease in burglary and 0.28 % reduction in violence against the person rates. 
Lagged sentencing coefficients are significant for theft and burglary (which 
Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression 
Models 
   
Fixed Effects 
   
 
Theft Burglary VATP 
Certainty (t-1) -0.29*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.28*** 
(0.09) 
Severity (t-1) -0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.2** 
(0.08) 
0.28** 
(0.11) 
Celerity (t-1) 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.24*** 
(0.06) 
Youth  -0.00009 
(0.2) 
-0.42 
(0.39) 
-0.14 
(0.64) 
Population Density -0.43 
(0.38) 
-1.1 
(0.57) 
0.44 
(0.78) 
Lower Quartile Earnings Ratio 0.06 
(0.17) 
0.79 
(0.51) 
0.41 
(0.35) 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 568 337 538 
R^2 (within) 0.7 0.85 0.85 
Note: dependant variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors are clustered at the 
PFA level. Coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** 
respectively. All variables in natural logarithm apart from the time trend. 
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combined accounts for more than half of total crimes between 1994 to 2008 
in England and Wales) and a 1% increase would reduce theft and burglary by 
0.08% and 0.2% respectively, also, for violence against the person has a 
significant and positive coefficient suggesting that a 1% increase in sentencing 
would increase violence against the person by 0.28%. Lagged waiting time 
coefficients are insignificant for burglary and theft rates, however, it is 
significant and negative for violence against the person. A 1% increase in 
waiting days would decrease violence against the person rate by 0.24%. This 
finding supports our hypothesis that longer waiting times for justice system 
to decide on a suitable punishment to offenders can have an ambiguous effect 
on crime rates. In particular, violent crimes can take longer to be resolved 
through the criminal justice system, whilst imposing a stricter bail conditions 
on the offenders while they are waiting. All socio-economic variables apart 
from population density on burglary are insignificant. 
 
Table 4: Instrumental Variable Approach 
   
Instrumental Variable Approach 
   
 
Theft Burglary VATP 
Certainty (t-1) -0.43*** 
(0.04) 
-0.33*** 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
Severity (t-1) -0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.36*** 
(0.08) 
Celerity (t-1) 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.24*** 
(0.06) 
Youth  -0.18 
(0.18) 
-0.14 
(0.33) 
-0.07 
(0.5) 
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Population Density 0.006 
(0.22) 
-1.12** 
(0.45) 
0.53 
(0.59) 
Lower Quartile Earnings Ratio 0.01 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.37) 
0.66* 
(0.4) 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
N 523 303 500 
R^2 (within) 0.67 0.83 0.81 
Note: dependant variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors are clustered at the PFA level. 
Coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. All variables in 
natural logarithm apart from the time trend. 
 
 
The Instrumental Variable approach results are similar to the ones reported 
with the fixed effect model. Lagged detection rate is still statistically significant 
at 1% level for theft and burglary offences, however, it drops significance for 
violence against the person crime category. A 1% increase in lagged detection 
rate would reduce theft rate by 0.43% and burglary rate by 0.33%. Lagged 
sentencing remains statistically significant for burglary and violence against 
the person offences but drops significance for theft. A 1% increase in lagged 
sentencing would decrease theft by 0.05%, burglary rate by 0.17% and increase 
violence against the person rate by 0.34%.  The effects of waiting times remain 
the same and there is no significant effect on either economic crimes but the 
significant and negative relationship remains between waiting times and 
violence against the person. The size of the coefficients does not change either 
and a 1% increase in waiting times would reduce violence against the person 
rate by 0.24%. For socioeconomic variables population density has a 
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significant and negative coefficient for burglary rates at 5% significance level 
and lower quartile earnings ratio gets a significant and positive coefficient for 
violence against the person rates at 10% significance level.  Thus, our findings 
using Instrumental Variable approach remain close to the ones in the fixed 
effects model. Also, the effect of the waiting days for the punishment to be 
announced remains exactly the same for the violence against the person 
offences. Longer waiting times, in fact, might reduce crime rates. Whilst the 
impact on celerity alone may encourage offenders to commit more crime the 
longer they wait, there is also an effect of possible monitoring imposed while 
they wait which would act in the opposite direction. Therefore, we can argue 
that the net effect we see on the violence against the person crime category is 
because the monitoring variable is stronger. Our results show that classic 
deterrence theory which claims that in order to fight and deter crime you need 
a certain, reasonably severe and swift punishment might not necessarily be 
fully supported by empirical findings. While certainty (detection) is unarguably 
a significant variable in crime deterrence, severe punishment and swiftness in 
justice system might not act as a significant crime determinant or at least not 
for all crime categories.  
 
2.8 Quadratic model  
 
We are also interested in checking whether longer waiting times for the 
punishment to be decided and announced can have a potential turning point 
– the point where the effect of longer waiting times changes from negative to 
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positive in terms of decreasing crime to increasing crime if offender is waiting 
for longer or the opposite. In order to test for this, we test a model where 
alongside lagged waiting times we also include a quadratic term of the lagged 
waiting times: 
Crimei,t = β1Certaintyi,t-1 + β2Severityi,t-1 + β3Celerityi,t-1,t + β4Youthi,t + β5Celerity
2
i,t-1 + 
β6Q25Earningsi,t + β7PopulationDensityi,t  + Dummy+  σi + εi,t 
(2) 
where i represents PFA, t represents time, σi is the unknown intercept for each 
PFA, and εi,t is the error term. The rest of the variables are the same as in the 
main specification above. Celerity2 stands for the quadratic form of the waiting 
times variable. 
 Results for quadratic model is presented in the Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: Fixed Effects – quadratic 
model 
   
 
Theft Burglary VATP 
Certainty (t-1) -0.29*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.28*** 
(0.08) 
Severity (t-1) -0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.20* 
(0.08) 
0.29** 
(0.11) 
Celerity (t-1) 0.16 
(0.53) 
0.32 
(0.9) 
-3.9** 
(1.7) 
Celerity (t-1) squared -0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.1) 
0.38** 
(0.38) 
Youth  -0.0001 
(0.21) 
-0.41 
(0.4) 
-0.1 
(0.68) 
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Population Density -0.42 
(0.36) 
-1.12* 
(0.56) 
0.43 
(0.76) 
Lower Quartile Earnings Ratio 0.06 
(0.17) 
0.79 
(0.5) 
0.48 
(0.76) 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
N 568 337 538 
R^2 (within) 0.7 0.85 0.85 
  
 
 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors are clustered at the PFA 
level. Coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. All 
variables in natural logarithm apart from the time trend. 
 
Results remain consistent with the ones discussed in the result section. 
Squared waiting time variable is only significant for the violence against the 
person crime category. It is positive and significant while linear term is 
negative and significant which suggests a non-monotonic relationship 
between waiting times and crime rate for violence against the person.  Figure 
1 below illustrates a plotted regression line with the scatter plot and illustrates 
the relationship between violence against the person rate and waiting times. 
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Figure 1: Waiting Times on Crime Rate 
 
In order to calculate the turning point, we need to take derivatives and 
calculate from what waiting time length crime rate starts to increase (full 
calculations can be found in the Appendix A.2). We find that violence against 
the person crime rate decreases while the waiting time in days is 164 or less, 
however, after that point, if waiting times are prolonged crime rate starts to 
increase. From our data we know that average waiting time for violence 
against the person is 120 days, hence, on average the effect of the current 
average waiting time in days is crime reducing. However, it is important to 
note, that if waiting times increase significantly, it will not in turn reduce the 
overall violence against the person crime rates but may in fact increase it. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
4 4.5 5 5.5
Log (Waiting Times)
Log (Violence Against the Person Rate) Fitted values
Violence Against the Person
Waiting Times on Crime Rate
39 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
There is a lot of debate about crime prevention and the effectiveness of the 
justice system, however, not all of it is based on formal quantitative analysis. 
We try to contribute with this study by providing an econometric analysis to 
enrich the understanding of how the effectiveness of the justice system 
actually affects different crime rates. In line with previous research, we find 
that detection plays a consistent role in reducing crime, and that severity of 
sanctions is ambiguous. For celerity, we find no significant effect for most 
crime types. However, for violence against the person, we find the opposite 
of what classical deterrence would predict. For that crime type, a longer period 
from crime committed to court sanction is associated with lower re-offending. 
This goes against the predictions of classical deterrence theory that would 
suggest some degree of substitution between different aspects of the sanction. 
If an individual has been arrested and is waiting for the court conviction and 
sentencing while in the community on bail, it might mean that they can be 
more closely monitored and the sanction for the previous offence has yet to 
be determined. Therefore, our celerity variable might be capturing both the 
celerity and monitoring variable which acts in opposite directions and, hence, 
the effect on violence against the person shows that the monitoring variable 
has a stronger effect between the two. One of Becker’s predictions is that 
increased severity should have the same impact as increased certainty, 
implying that costly enforcement of the law could be reduced in favour of 
higher penalties. One response to this not being empirically borne out is to 
suggest that these elements of deterrence cannot be conceptually separated 
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from each other and that their impacts need to be considered as one package 
(Mendes, 2004, Mendes and McDonald, 2001, Howe and Brandau, 1988). Our 
suggestion is that some of these differences reflect the variable impact of 
specific and general deterrence, and in particular, the difference between the 
experience of punishment and the future prospect of it. 
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3. Alternatives to custody: evidence from police force 
areas in the United Kingdom6 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
World-wide prison populations have increased substantially since the mid-
1990s In England and Wales, the prison population increased from around 
17,400 in 1900 to over 85,300 in 2016, and in March 2017 the total prison 
population was just over 85,500 (Allen et al., 2017).  In 1901 there were 86 
prisoners per 100,000 head of population which increased to 182 per 100,000 
head of population by 2016.  Incarceration is an expensive and socially divisive 
response to crime but its use is often justified not only on grounds that it is a 
fitting punishment but also in the belief that it reduces crime. Its effectiveness 
is contested (Jolliffe and Hedderman, 2015) and given its costs, finding 
effective alternatives to custody is a key motivation for policymakers and 
question for researchers. This question has become even more urgent 
following the financial crisis and the demand for governments to make cuts 
in public services, including the criminal justice system (Neilson, 2010, 
Bandyopadhyay, 2013). While community sentences have existed in some 
form since 1907 (Solomon and Silvestri, 2008), in recent decades criminal 
justice legislation has expanded the range of formal requirements available to 
courts when imposing them. These can include regular supervision, electronic 
tagging, curfews, unpaid work and participation in drug rehabilitation 
                                                             
6 The analysis in this chapter is partly based on Abramovaite et. al 2018 
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programs. Similar requirements can be imposed as orders that are part of a 
suspended prison sentence. As a result, courts in England and Wales now 
have the power to sentence offenders to a range of non-custodial alternatives 
with varying levels of prospective deterrence, punishment severity, 
surveillance and associated rehabilitative support. This paper offers an 
empirical analysis of how effective these alternative sentences are at reducing 
crime compared to custody.  
 
The annual average cost for each prison place is £36,808 (figure for England 
and Wales, 2012-13, taken from Prison Reform Trust, 2014)7 while each new 
prison place is estimated to cost £119,000.  By contrast, an intensive 
community order costs between £10,000 and £15,000. A Home Detention 
Curfew for 90 days is estimated to cost £1,300 compared to £6,500 for a 
similar period in custody (Heard, 2015). Although much cheaper, the 
effectiveness of these alternatives to custody at achieving crime reduction has 
not been fully explored. 
 
The impact of incarceration on crime reduction is theoretically ambiguous 
since there are many counter-balancing effects through which prison can 
affect crime rates (Friehe and Miceli, 2017). The key mechanisms through 
which prison is theorised to reduce crime is: incapacitation of individual 
                                                             
7http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/Prison%20the%20facts%20
May%202014.pdf 
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offenders, which prevents crime against the community while they are 
incarcerated; specific deterrence in which prison, as punishment, dissuades an 
offender from committing crime in the future; and general deterrence which 
is supposed to discourage a population of potential offenders from 
committing crime through the prospect and expectation of punishment 
(Becker, 1968, Kessler and Levitt, 1999).  
 
However, there are also mechanisms through which prison is theorised to 
have criminogenic effects (Engelen et al., 2016). Prisons can: prevent 
offenders from acquiring useful skills in legitimate labour markets, label 
offenders formally as deviant, marking them as unsuitable for reintegration 
into society,  have psychologically destructive effects that prevents prisoners 
from returning to normal life when released, reduce access to and even destroy 
familial relationships and other sources of social support and integration; and 
generate a pro-crime environment where prisoner peer groups, and even 
prison officers, reinforce deviant identities and behaviours (Smith et al., 2002, 
Cid, 2009, Cullen et al., 2011). At the most extreme end of the criminogenic 
spectrum, incarceration can foster prison gang membership with significantly 
increased recidivism on release (Dooley et al., 2014, Skarbek, 2011).  
 
As Durlauf and Nagin (2010) summarise, prison is not just a punishment. It 
is also a concentrated experience of socialisation with other offenders. Former 
prisoners can struggle to find legitimate work but may have developed lasting 
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associations with other criminals, making crime more materially attractive and 
normatively acceptable. In the United Kingdom, sceptics of penal sanctions 
point to frequently high re-offending rates on release from prison as evidence 
of some of these effects (Hedderman, 2008). 
 
Our contribution is to use a unique panel data at Police Force Area level in 
England and Wales in order to understand the impact of alternative 
sentencing policies such as community sentences on crime rates. This data set 
was requested through a Freedom of Information request. It details how many 
different sentences have been issued for all crime types each year from 2002 
to 2013. This data set allows us to distinguish between the number of prison 
sentences (custody) and non-custodial sentences (community sentences, 
conditional discharge, fines and suspended sentences) imposed by local 
courts. We exploit the significant sentencing discretion traditionally granted 
to local courts (Brownlee and Joanes, 1993, Tombs and Jagger, 2006, Pina- 
Sánchez and Linacre, 2013, Pina- Sánchez et al., 2017), and plausibly 
maintained even after the introduction of compulsory sentencing guidelines 
(Roberts, 2011). This allows for a more detailed examination of criminal 
justice practice on PFA level crime than has yet been achieved in the United 
Kingdom, and is rarely matched elsewhere in the world. We analyse the effect 
of alternative sentencing methods on crime rates in the PFAs by using 
sentence type and offence type conviction rates derived from data on total 
number of sentences across all PFAs each year. Our data are offence-type 
specific. Therefore, it allows us to explore alternative sentencing effects on 
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different crime types. Our model of using variations in sentencing data across 
PFAs, rather than prison population, means that we can compare the different 
ways in which courts use prison as a sentencing option, rather than just how 
much they are using them, and avoid some of the well-established problems 
with using prison data (Spelman, 2008). 
 
We show that prison, in some circumstances, can be effective at reducing 
acquisitive crime, but that alternatives to custody are also effective in many 
cases. Although our results are most directly applicable to England and Wales, 
they have relevance to a more general understanding of criminal justice 
effectiveness. Our data cover a range of sentencing practice which, although 
still punitive by European standards, involves markedly less overall 
incarceration than in the United States (Tonry, 1999). Our study might help 
to provide some tentative support for arguments that sentencing policy can 
be reformed to rely less on punitive sanctions to reduce crime. 
 
An important caveat is that it is not possible to disaggregate all the 
mechanisms through which criminal justice might affect crime rates. As 
Durlauf and Nagin (2010) note of panel data approaches generally, 'these 
studies are actually measuring a combination of deterrent and incapacitation 
effects'.  
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3.2 Previous research 
 
3.2.1 The effects of sentencing policy on individual offenders 
 
 
An array of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have examined the effects of 
short periods of custody on offenders compared to alternative sentences 
(Killias et al., 2000, Killias and Villetaz, 2008, Killias et al., 2010). The results 
are not conclusive but suggest that prison for low-level offenders might have 
a small criminogenic effect, but that existing offender characteristics are much 
larger predictors of criminal career prospects. These studies (Killias et al. 2000, 
Killias et al. 2010) followed 123 subjects randomly assigned to community 
sentence or immediate short term custody in Switzerland. After two years, the 
results showed no difference with respect to subsequent employment history, 
and social and private life circumstances, but re-arrest by the police was more 
frequent among those randomly assigned to prison than among those selected 
for community service. However, eleven years later, ex-prisoners had more 
positive outcomes. They complied more consistently with tax regulations, and 
fared no worse regarding employment history or marital status. In line with 
recent systematic reviews, the results do not suggest that short custodial 
sanctions are harmful when compared to community service. However, the 
evidence is still relatively limited.  
 
Although RCTs have arguably the highest levels of internal validity, how far 
these results can be extrapolated to a general population of offenders is 
questionable. It is rare that justice systems can permit random selection of 
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sanctions. When they do, the offenders studied are necessarily low-level, as 
they have to be eligible for a community disposal. Comparatively small 
numbers of offenders are included in these studies with the result that small 
effects might be hard to detect with certainty. 
 
Matching studies, therefore, allow for a much wider comparison of offenders. 
Smith et al. (2002) systematically reviewed studies which compared the effects 
of community sentences with custodial sentences. They restricted their survey 
to those with good study designs which controlled for offender characteristics 
and found 31 eligible studies. A small effect suggesting that prison sentences 
might be associated with increased recidivism was found. They concluded that 
variations in the kind of sentence ‘did not produce decreases in recidivism’ 
although they did find ‘tentative indications that increasing lengths of 
incarceration were associated with slightly greater increases in recidivism’. 
 
Cid (2009) examined the effects of custodial versus non-custodial sentences 
on recidivism. They conducted an eight year follow up study where rates of 
reoffending between former prisoners and offenders who served a suspended 
prison sentence were compared. This study concluded that the offenders 
given suspended sentences had a lower risk of reoffending than those given 
prison sentences.  Jolliffe and Hedderman (2015) analysed the effect of prison 
and community sentence on future offending. They used a sample of 5,500 
offenders from 1 of 10 regions in the United Kingdom. Using propensity 
score matching to balance pre-existing differences between two groups of 
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offenders, they found that incarcerated offenders tended to commit more 
offenses after their release and started reoffending earlier than those 
supervised in the community. They concluded that alongside other emerging 
evidence prison sentences tends to slightly increase the chances of future 
offending. 
 
Nieuwbeerta et al. (2009) identified the effects of first-time incarceration on 
individual offenders in the Netherlands. They used risk-matching to control 
for individual differences between offenders given custodial sentences 
compared with alternatives. They examined criminal activity 3 years following 
the different judicial interventions, and concluded that being incarcerated had 
a criminogenic effect, putting offenders on a more serious criminal career 
path. Similarly, Wermink et al. (2010) found that offenders reoffended 
significantly less after completing community sentence compared to a short 
term imprisonment.  
 
Andersen (2015) analysed full-sample individual-level data in Denmark, using 
difference-in-differences matching to measure the effects of doing 
community sentence as an alternative to serving a prison sentence. This study 
had the benefit of measuring several short and long-term post-sentence 
outcomes.  The results suggested that offenders given a community sentence 
had higher incomes and were less dependent on social benefits in the long 
term. However, there was no overall evidence of lower recidivism rates. 
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Andersen and Andersen (2014) found that electronic tagging, as an alternative 
to prison, had a similarly beneficial impact on juvenile offenders. 
 
The Ministry of Justice in the United Kingdom performed its own study, 
comparing incarcerated offenders with those given community sentences, 
matching them by propensity to be imprisoned (Bell, 2011). The results 
suggested that those given community sentences were less likely to re-offend. 
However, the same approach, comparing matched offenders given different 
lengths of prison sentences found that offenders imprisoned for longer 
tended to be less likely to re-offend. One potential weakness in this study is 
that it compared prisoners on release to other offenders just starting a 
community sentence, thus excluding the incapacitation element of the prison 
sentence while including the potential incapacitation associated with a 
community sentence. 
 
Marsh and Fox (2008) used the estimates of the differential impact of 
sentencing into estimates of the economic efficiency of alternative sentencing 
options in the UK. They concluded that standard prison sentences are not an 
economically efficient means for reducing re-offending.  They found that 
diverting adult offenders from standard prison sentences to alternative 
interventions saves the UK public sector between £19,000 to £88,000 per 
offender. Also, when considering victim costs, diverting offenders from 
standard prison sentences saves between £17,500 to £203,000 per offender. 
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Marsh et al. (2009) reviewed 19 studies and identified 91 estimates of the effect 
on re-offending of prison for adults when compared against alternative 
sentences and 15 estimates of the effect on re-offending of prisons for 
juveniles when compared against alternative sentences. After conducting a 
meta-analysis on the different combinations of interventions, they suggest that 
the following alternative sentences for adult offenders reduce re-offending 
when compared to prison: residential drug treatment, surveillance, 
surveillance with drug treatment, prison in combination with 
educational/vocational interventions, prison in combination with behavioural 
interventions, prison in combination with sex offender treatment, and prison 
in combination with drug treatment. In addition, two types of alternative 
sentences for juvenile offenders - community supervision with victim 
reparation, and a community programme with aftercare and surveillance – 
reduced re-offending when compared to prison. They concluded that prison 
sentences are generally not an efficient means of reducing re-offending in the 
UK, however, they also highlighted that despite their efforts to focus on the 
best research designs available some studies failed to eliminate differences 
between the treatment and control groups , used poor research design, much 
of the data available were collected in the USA and there were large amounts 
of variability in the effect sizes particularly for the enhancements to prison for 
adult offenders such as education/vocational interventions, sex offender 
treatments and drug treatment in prison. 
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3.2.2 The effects of sentencing policy on aggregate level data 
 
Not all of the theorised effects of sentencing involve only the effect on 
individual offenders. The use of district-level data are important additions to 
our understanding of how the criminal justice system influences a 
community’s experience of crime. Whereas studies of re-offending statistics 
can only capture the effect of criminal justice interventions on subsequent re-
offending by individuals, panel data, in principle, can estimate the number of 
crimes prevented through incapacitation and general deterrence in a 
population of potential offenders. 
 
In the United States, several panel studies have been used to explore the 
effects of incarceration on crime rates (Durlauf and Nagin, 2010). The results 
were inconsistent, with only some studies suggesting that prison population 
growth had a small deterrent effect. Vieratis et al. (2007) combined panel data 
of prison growth and prisoner releases. They found that prison growth was 
associated with lower crime but that releasing prisoners was associated with 
higher crime and because they controlled for changes in prison population 
levels they attributed this effect to the criminogenic effects of incarceration. 
This suggests that the crime reduction effect of more incarceration can be 
short-lived, and that use of prison might be a double-edged sword that can 
easily prove counter-productive. More recently, Spelman (2013) offered a 
solution to disentangling the co-dependence of crime and prisons, by finding 
instruments for crime that predict changes in prison population, before 
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deriving the effects of prison on crime. His results suggested that increased 
use of prison was, on balance, crime reductive in the US. 
 
In Europe, a panel study comparing justice systems in German states 
(Spengler, 2006)   found that higher conviction rates were associated with 
lower crime rates but not the form, or severity, of sanction. Another panel of 
Greek regions (Saridakis and Spengler, 2012) found that property crime was 
deterred by higher clear-up rates and reduced by lower unemployment, but 
these effects were generally insignificant for violent crime. 
 
In the United Kingdom, a number of researchers have used police force areas 
(PFAs) and counties to develop panel level data and explore crime rate 
relationship with other factors. Witt et al. (1999) linked increasing wage 
inequality and more cars per capita with higher crime, but also found that a 
larger police force was associated with lower property crime. Carmichael and 
Ward (2001) established a systematic positive relationship between most 
crime and male unemployment. Machin and Meghir (2004) found that fewer 
opportunities for low-wage work were associated with higher acquisitive 
crime, and also suggested that potential offenders are deterred by higher 
conviction rates. Han et al. (2013) found strong relationships between higher 
police detection rates and lower crime rates in subsequent years. 
Bandyopadhyay et. al (2012) explore how variation in sentence length affect 
crime rates. However, few non-U.S. analyses have been able to explore 
variation in sentencing subsequent to conviction. An important exception to 
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this is Bell et al. (2014) which exploits variation in sentence severity following 
the 2011 riots in London to identify a deterrent effect of harsher sentencing. 
Our approach, therefore, has the unique advantage of observing sentencing 
variation in hitherto unexamined detail. 
 
3.3 Data 
 
We obtained a unique dataset from the Ministry of Justice through a Freedom 
of Information request detailing how many different sentences have been issued 
for those crime types in each year.  In the UK, sentencing is classified into 
custodial and non-custodial.  Custodial sentences include immediate custodial 
sentences (both of determinate and indeterminate length) and suspended 
sentences. Non-custodial sentences include fines, community service, 
conditional discharge and absolute discharge.  Our data include the total 
number of sentences issued to adult and juvenile offenders in each PFA every 
year for each sentence type as listed above. We use this data to test whether 
different sentencing (with a lag) has a different effect on crime rates. As we 
have data on sentencing for adults and juveniles separately, we analyse the 
effects of sentencing for both age groups jointly and then separately. Total 
crime committed by the juvenile offenders is lower than adult offenders. 
However, young people are over represented in the criminal justice system.8 
                                                             
8 In 2012/13 police made around 1.07 million arrests. 11.8 per cent of those (total of 126,809) 
were young people aged 10 – 17 and for notifiable offences. In that year, young people 
accounted for 10.5 percent of the offending age population (10 years old or older) which 
suggests that young people are over-represented in the criminal justice system.  
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Therefore, it is useful to analyse the effects of sentencing juvenile offenders 
on crime rates separately to adult offenders. 
 
Our data show us at each PFA9 in England and Wales, (from 2002 to 2013) 
how many crimes have been recorded in four different crime categories – 
violence against the person, sex offences, robberies and property crimes. 
These four crime categories account for around 90 per cent of total crimes 
recorded across England and Wales between 2002 and 2013 (Appendix B.1). 
The majority of offences were categorised under the property crime category. 
Graph 2 in the Appendix B.2 shows the composition of property crime. The 
main categories being criminal damage, all other theft offences, vehicle thefts 
and burglary offences. For violent crimes, violence against the person 
accounts for the majority of the total violent offences recorded (Appendix 
B.3).  
 
 
Our dependent variable is crime rate per 1000 people for each PFA for each 
time period. Our analysis includes violence against the person, sex offences, 
robbery and property crimes. As we are interested in how sentencing works 
and how alternatives to custody affects crime rate, for our independent 
variables, we derive “sentence-conviction rate” which we derive by taking the 
total number of criminals sentenced to, for example, custody in the particular 
year in each PFA and dividing that number by the total number of crimes 
                                                             
9 We are using data for all PFAs apart from the City of London because it is a small 
area that contains the Central Criminal Court of England and Wales (colloquially 
known as the Old Bailey) which tries cases from outside the area. 
55 
 
registered in each PFA that year and multiplying it by 100 to derive a rate. 
“Sentence-conviction rate” can be represented as following: 
 
 "𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒" =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒,𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒,𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
∗ 100  
 
We do this for all crime types listed above. Our derived conviction rate for 
each sentencing type (and for each offence type) is correlated with detection 
rate as only the detected crimes get sentences issued to the offenders. 
Conviction rate is sometimes used as a proxy for detection rate (Machin and 
Meghir 2004). Moreover, this type of conviction rate allows us to look into 
each sentencing type separately.  While we have sentencing data separated for 
adult and juvenile offenders and the effect of that can be captured separately, 
recorded crime rate has a victim but cannot be matched with an offender (in 
a large percentage of cases we do not even know who the offender is), and 
thus we cannot separate our dependent variable to crime rate for adult 
offenders only or for juvenile offenders only. Therefore, we run two empirical 
models – one with total sentence-conviction rate for all of the offenders and 
another one where sentence-conviction rate is separated for adult and juvenile 
offenders.  Descriptive statistics for all four crime types averaged for 2002 – 
2013 period are reported in Table 6 below.  
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics od Dependent Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Violence Against the Person (VATP) – rate per 1000 people 12.18 3.08 
Sex Offences – rate per 1000 people 0.96 0.21 
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Robbery – rate per 1000 people 0.91 0.94 
Property crime – rate per 1000 people 58.27 19.24 
   
Note: All crime rates are defined as the number of offences per 1000 
population; There is a total of 504 “PFA – year observations” in the sample 
(42 PFA by 12 years) 
 
  
 
We include data on unemployment and proportion of youth population so 
that we can control for socio-economic factors which could contribute to 
changes in crime rates. Also, we include a total of police officers’ salaries as 
that represents the strength of the police presence and might affect crime 
rates. Unemployment rate is defined as a proportion of unemployment 
benefits claimants to the total number of people in the workforce. We 
obtained unemployment figures from Labour Force Survey and Annual 
Population Survey. Unemployment data are available yearly at each PFA level. 
Police officers’ salaries are the totals (in £’000) of how much each PFA spent 
yearly on police officers’ salaries (CIPFA). The variable youth population is 
defined as a proportion of young people aged 15 to 24 to the entire 
population. The data source is mid-year estimated population by age and 
gender from National Statistics. The number of people aged 15 to 24 has been 
calculated by aggregating each year group at local authority level and then it 
was aggregated into PFAs according to their geographic boundaries. 
Descriptive statistics for conviction rates and socio-economic variables are 
reported in Table 7 below. 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
   
VATP – Conviction Rate for Community Sentence 1.59 0.72 
VATP – Conviction Rate for Custody 1.65 0.56 
VATP – Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge 0.19 0.11 
VATP – Conviction Rate for Fine 0.2 0.12 
VATP – Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence 0.69 0.54 
   
VATP - Adult Conviction Rate for Community Sentence  1.12 0.53 
VATP - Adult Conviction Rate for Custody  1.55 0.53 
VATP - Adult Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge  0.17 0.1 
VATP - Adult Conviction Rate for Fine  0.19 0.12 
VATP - Adult Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence  0.69 0.54 
VATP - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Community Sentence  0.47 0.24 
VATP - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Custody  0.1 0.06 
   
Sex Offences – Conviction Rate for Community Sentence 2.72 1.01 
Sex Offences – Conviction Rate for Custody 5.73 1.77 
Sex Offences – Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge 0.27 0.26 
Sex Offences – Conviction Rate for Fine 0.28 0.34 
Sex Offences – Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence 0.63 0.51 
   
Sex Offences - Adult Conviction Rate for Community Sentence  2 0.78 
Sex Offences - Adult Conviction Rate for Custody  5.57 1.72 
Sex Offences - Adult Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge  0.24 0.23 
Sex Offences - Adult Conviction Rate for Fine  0.26 0.3 
Sex Offences - Adult Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence  0.63 0.51 
Sex Offences - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Community Sentence  0.73 0.43 
Sex Offences - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Custody  0.17 0.18 
   
Robbery – Conviction Rate for Community Sentence 3.33 1.86 
Robbery – Conviction Rate for Custody 11.58 7.03 
Robbery – Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge 0.04 0.16 
Robbery – Conviction Rate for Fine 0.04 0.31 
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Robbery – Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence 0.76 0.95 
   
Robbery - Adult Conviction Rate for Community Sentence  0.7 0.75 
Robbery - Adult Conviction Rate for Custody  9.87 6.6 
Robbery - Adult Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge  0.02 0.08 
Robbery - Adult Conviction Rate for Fine  0.02 0.2 
Robbery - Adult Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence  0.76 0.95 
Robbery - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Community Sentence  2.63 1.65 
Robbery - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Custody  1.7 1.1 
   
Property Crime – Conviction Rate for Community Sentence 1.64 0.58 
Property Crime – Conviction Rate for Custody 0.99 0.35 
Property Crime – Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge 0.84 0.41 
Property Crime – Conviction Rate for Fine 0.62 0.33 
Property Crime – Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence 0.23 0.2 
   
Property Crime - Adult Conviction Rate for Community Sentence  1.14 0.47 
Property Crime - Adult Conviction Rate for Custody  0.94 0.34 
Property Crime - Adult Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge  0.79 0.4 
Property Crime - Adult Conviction Rate for Fine  0.6 0.32 
Property Crime - Adult Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence  0.23 0.2 
Property Crime - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Community Sentence  0.5 0.18 
Property Crime - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Custody  0.05 0.02 
Property Crime - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge 0.06 0.03 
Property Crime - Juvenile Conviction Rate for Fine 0.02 0.02 
   
Unemployment 5.85 2.2 
Police Officer’s Salaries 251.86 145.24 
Youth 15 - 24 12.76 1.16 
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3.4 Total Number of Sentenced Offenders for Each Offence Type 
 
 
For all crime categories, we established the total number of sentences issued 
to offenders for the period of 2002 - 2013. This gives us a clearer picture of 
what sentences are more dominant. It also allows us to see whether sentencing 
practices differ for adult and juvenile offenders. Figure 2 below illustrates a 
total number of offenders who received Absolute Discharge, Community 
Sentence, Conditional Discharge, Custody, Fine, Suspended Sentence and 
Otherwise Dealt With for the violence against the person crime category. 
 
 
Figure 2: Total Number of Sentences Issued for Adult and Juvenile Offenders, Violence 
Against the Person, England and Wales, 2002 - 2013 
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The top part of the graph refers to adult offenders while the bottom part of 
the graph refers to juvenile offenders. The total number of sentences given to 
adults is much larger, as there are many more arrests for adult offenders than 
juvenile offenders (in the year ending March 2015 there were around 950,000 
arrests for notifiable offences in England and Wales, of which 94,960 were of 
people aged 10-17 years.) The most common sentence type issued to adult 
offenders for these offence categories was custody while for juvenile 
offenders it was community sentence. Both of these sentences account for 73 
per cent of total sentences issued, therefore, we can conclude that community 
sentence and custody are the most used sentences to offenders for violence 
against the person category. However, for adult offenders custody is more 
prevalent than community service whilst it is the other way round for the 
juvenile offenders. We now present the same break up across different crime 
types. 
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Figure 3: Total Number of Sentences Issued for Adult and Juvenile Offenders, Sex 
Offences, England and Wales, 2002 - 2013 
 
Figure 3 refers to the sex offences and illustrates how the sentences were 
distributed for adult and juvenile offenders. For the adult offenders, custody 
is by far the most dominant sentence with almost 35 thousand custody 
sentences issued over 2002 and 2013 followed by the community sentence 
with around 12 thousand sentences issued. Both violence against the person 
and sex offences have a very small number of absolute discharge sentences 
issued while fines and conditional discharges were used less. For the juvenile 
offenders, community sentence accounts for the largest number of the issued 
sentences followed by custody. Same as with the adult offenders absolute 
discharge, conditional discharge and fines do not account for a large number 
of the total sentences. 
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Figure 4: Total Number of Sentences Issued for Adult and Juvenile Offenders, Robbery, 
England and Wales, 2002 - 2013 
 
 
Figure 4 above refers to robberies and how many sentences were issued to 
adult and juvenile offenders for the given time period. Same as with the other 
two violent crimes (violence against the person and sex offences) for adult 
offenders custody is by far the most prevalent sentence accounting for almost 
85 per cent of the total sentences issued to adult offenders for robbery. 
Community sentence came second with just under 8 per cent of the total 
sentences issued. For juvenile offenders two thirds received community 
sentence while just under 30 per cent received custody and all other types of 
sentences accounted for less than 3 per cent. Overall, we can observe the same 
trend with all three violent crime types for adult and juvenile offenders. There 
are more adult offenders receiving custody than community sentence and 
there are more juvenile offenders receiving community sentence than custody. 
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Figure 5: Total Number of Sentences Issued for Adult and Juvenile Offenders, Property 
Crime, England and Wales, 2002 – 2013 
 
For Property crime, we can see from the Figure 5 above that for adult 
offenders sentencing becomes more diverse. Community sentence accounts 
for the largest number of sentences issued followed by the custody and 
conditional discharge. Whilst absolute discharge still remains in low numbers, 
we can see that there are more fines being issued. Community sentence is the 
most prevalent for juvenile offenders, conditional discharge is second while 
custody is third by the number of sentences issued. The main difference in 
property crime with regards to the sentences issued is that for adult offenders 
community sentence is used more often than custody which is opposite to the 
violent crimes mentioned above. Moreover, other non-custodial sentences are 
used more than in violent crime cases.  
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3.5 Empirical model  
 
The econometric specification of our main model is as follows: 
 
CrimeRatei,t = β1CommunitySenti,t-1 + β2Custodyi,t-1 + β3ConditionalDischargei,t-1 + 
β4Finei,t-1 + β5SuspendedSentencei,t-1 + β6PoliceOfficersSalariesi,t + β7Unempli,t+ 
β8Youthi,t  + σi + µt + εi,t 
(3) 
 
where i represents the Police Force Authority, t represents time, σi is the 
unknown intercept for each PFA, µt represents year fixed effects which are 
needed to account for PFA specific year changes, and εi,t is the error term. The 
explanatory variables, CommunitySent  stands for the conviction rate for all 
offenders who got sentenced with a community sentence, Custody is the 
conviction rate for all offenders who got issued a custodial sentence, 
ConditionalDischarge is the conviction rate for all offenders who received 
conditional discharge as a sentence for the crime they have committed, Fine is 
the conviction rate for the offenders who were fined, SuspendedSentence is the 
conviction rate for all offenders who received suspended sentence. Also, 
PoliceOfficersSalaries stands for total cost of police salaries, Unempl for 
unemployment rate and Youth for the ratio of people aged 15 to 24 in the 
population. 
 
We are using PFA level fixed effects in order to eliminate unobserved area-
specific time-invariant effects and thus controlling for the average differences 
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across PFAs for any observable or unobservable predictors, such as 
differences in size, characteristics and many others. In that way, the fixed 
effect coefficients control for all the across-PFA variation and we are left with 
the within-PFA variation, which helps us greatly reduce the problem of 
omitted variable bias. We also include fixed time effects into our estimation 
model as the year dummies pick up any variation in the outcome that happen 
over time and that is not attributed to our other explanatory variables. 
 
For conviction rates we are using lagged variables in order to minimise 
possible issues with the endogeneity which arises due to possible reverse 
causality between our dependent variable – crime rate – and conviction rate 
as both of them can have an effect on each other. Hence, including a time lag 
on conviction rate minimises the effect since crime rate this year cannot affect 
the conviction rate last year.  
 
Also, alongside our main model, we want to test the relationship between 
crime rate and conviction rates for adult and juvenile offenders separately. We 
keep the rest of the model the same. However, since sentences issued to the 
offenders for violent crimes and property crime vary and there are more non-
custodial sentences used for both adult and juvenile offenders for property 
crime offences, the econometric specification slightly differs between violent 
and property crimes as we include more non-custodial sentences for juvenile 
offenders in the latter. 
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Econometric specification of the model for violence against the person, 
robbery and sex offences is as follows: 
 
CrimeRatei,t = β1AConvictionCSi,t-1 + β2AConvictionCusti,t-1 + β3AConvictionCDi,t-1 
+ β4AConvictionFi,t-1 + β5AConvictionSSi,t-1 + β6JConvictionCSi,t-1  + 
β7JConvictionCusti,t-1 + β8PoliceOfficersSalariesi,t + β9Unempli,t+ β9Youthi,t  + σi + µt 
+ εi,t 
(4) 
 
where i represents the cross-section unit of observation, t represents time, σi 
is the unknown intercept for each PFA, µt represents year fixed effects which 
are needed to account for PFA specific year changes, and εi,t is the error term. 
As for explanatory variables, AConvictionCS stands for the conviction rate for 
adults who got sentenced with a community sentence, AConvictionCust is the 
conviction rate for adults who got issued a custody, AConvictionCD is the 
conviction rate for adults who received conditional discharge as a sentence 
for the crime they have committed, AConvictionF is the conviction rate for the 
adults offenders who were fined, AConvictionSS is the conviction rate for 
adults offenders who received suspended sentence, JConvictionCS is the 
conviction rate for juvenile offenders who got sentenced with a community 
sentence and JConvictionCust is the conviction rate for juvenile offenders who 
got issued a custody.  
 
For property crime econometric specification is as follows: 
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CrimeRatei,t = β1AConvictionCSi,t-1 + β2AConvictionCusti,t-1 + β3AConvictionCDi,t-1 
+ β4AConvictionFi,t-1 + β5AConvictionSSi,t-1 + β6JConvictionCSi,t-1  + 
β7JConvictionCusti,t-1 + β8JConvictionCDi,t-1 +  β9JConvictionFi,t-1 + 
β8PoliceOfficersSalariesi,t + β9Unempli,t+ β9Youthi,t  ,t+  σi + µt + εi,t 
 
Everything else being the same as in the model above we also include 
conviction rate for juvenile offenders who got conditional discharge which is 
labelled as JConvictionCD and conviction rate for juvenile offenders who were 
fined for the property crime offences they have committed which is labelled 
as JConvictionF.  
 
 
3.6 Results  
 
 
The empirical results of our main model are presented in the Table 8 below. 
They are presented in the elasticity form which was derived from level-level 
coefficients (Appendix B.5) using sample means in order to make the 
interpretation easier. 
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Table 8: Fixed effects regression models 
 
VATP Sex 
Offences 
Robbery Property 
Crime 
Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1) -0.04 -0.03 -0.1*** -0.2*** 
Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1) -0.2*** -0.12*** 0.05 -0.15** 
Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1) -0.01 -0.001** -0.0009 0.04 
Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1) 0.01 0.0004 0.004 0.06** 
Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence (t-1) -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00008 
Police Officers’ Salaries 0.0008 0.03 0.01 0.0007 
Unemployment -0.12** -0.06 -0.39* -0.14*** 
Youth 15 - 24 -0.23 -0.27 1.4** 0.41** 
Fixed Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 462 462 462 462 
R^2 (within) 0.71 0.4 0.51 0.9 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people. Coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. 
Results are converted to elasticity form using sample means from the level-
level results reported in the Appendix B.5. Robust Standard errors are 
reported in the Appendix B.5. 
 
For violence against the person offences the conviction rate for community 
sentence has a negative but insignificant effect of 0.04%. However, the 
conviction rate for the custody has a negative and significant coefficient. A 
1% increase in the conviction rate for the custody would reduce crime rate by 
0.2%. Coefficients of the conviction rates for conditional discharge and 
suspended sentence are both negative but insignificant and the coefficient of 
the conviction rate for fines is positive but insignificant.  
 
For sex offences, the conviction rate for community sentence is negative but 
insignificant as was the case for violence against the person. However, custody 
has negative and significant effect on sexual offences rate suggesting that a 
1% increase in the conviction rate for custody would reduce crime rate by 
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0.12%. This is a similar finding to the one we found for the violence against 
the person crime rates. The effect of conditional discharge is different as for 
sexual offences the effect is negative and significant. A 1% increase in the 
conviction rate for conditional discharge would reduce crime rate by 0.001%. 
Conviction rates for fine and suspended sentence are positive and negative 
respectively but both are insignificant. 
 
For robbery offences, the impact of more convictions leading to a community 
sentence is negative and significant. A 1% increase in the conviction rate for 
community sentence reduces crime rate by 0.1%. The conviction rate for the 
custody is positive and insignificant and that is the opposite effect that we 
found for the violence against the person and sexual offences. This suggests 
that sentencing types can have different effects on different crime types. For 
example, if community sentence is not an effective way to combat one crime 
type it does not mean that it will not be effective for a different offence 
category. Other conviction rates for sentencing are insignificant.  
 
For property offences, which is the only economic crime type in our analysis, 
both conviction rates for the community sentence and for the custody are 
significant and negative. A 1% increase in the conviction rate for the 
community sentence would reduce crime rate by 0.2% while a 1% increase in 
the conviction rate for the custody would reduce it by 0.15%. This suggests 
that alternatives to custody can sometimes be more effective than 
incarceration. Conviction rates for the conditional discharge and suspended 
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sentence are both insignificant. However, conviction rate for fines is positive 
and significant. It shows that a 1% increase in the conviction rate for the fine 
would increase property crime rate by 0.06%. Since it is an economically 
motivated crime, it is possible that paying fines reduces the offender’s income. 
Therefore, more crime could be encouraged thereafter in order to compensate 
for the financial losses fines have imposed.  
 
Other explanatory variables - unemployment, police officers’ salaries and 
proportion of youth in the population – were also included in our analysis. 
For violence against the person offences only unemployment has a significant 
effect of 0.12% reduction if increased by 1%. For sex offences all of the 
variables are insignificant. For robbery offences unemployment has a negative 
and significant coefficient, a 1% increase in unemployment reducing crime 
rate by 0.39%. Also, the youth variable is positive and significant. A 1% 
increase in youth population would increase robbery rate by 1.4%. This is 
different from violence against the person and sexual offences. This may 
reflect the different economic motivations associated with robbery compared 
to other forms of violence. For property crime, unemployment has a negative 
and significant co-efficient, a 1% increase in unemployment would reduce 
crime by 0.14%.  The youth variable is positive and significant and it suggests 
that a 1% increase in youth population would increase property crime rate by 
0.41%. Youth variable has an effect predicted by the theory due to lower 
opportunity costs for the younger people. Younger people on average earn 
less and if caught would have less to lose in earnings than older population. 
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Also, young offenders often receive more lenient punishment. As for 
unemployment, Ehrlich (1973) argues that its effect on crime in ambiguous 
and unemployment has both motivation and opportunity effects as explained 
by Cantor and Land (1985). Opportunities to commit crime decrease when 
more people are out of job – less opportunities to commit a crime in a 
workplace and more time to guard your home during the day (see 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2012) for fraud and robbery). Also, economic theory 
emphasises the economic attractiveness of an area to potential offenders 
suggesting some crime spillover effects across the areas.  
 
Overall our results suggest that alternatives to custody can be as effective in 
reducing crime rates as incarceration. However, there is variance between 
crime types. Violent and sexual offences are more affected by the custodial 
sentences while robbery and property crime can be managed at least as 
effectively by the community sentences based on our findings. Economic and 
non-economic crimes could have a different motivation by the offenders who 
committed these crimes and with the aggregate data we are unable to separate 
general deterrence effect from incapacitation effect but our results suggest 
that alternatives to custody can work more effectively on economic crimes 
such as property crime (robbery is classified as a violent crime but does not 
always contain a violence) than on violent crimes such as violence against the 
person and sexual offences. 
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Table 9 below reports our findings about the relationship between crime rates 
and conviction rates for adult and juvenile offenders separately. As with the 
main results table, these results are presented in the elasticity form which was 
derived from level-level coefficients (Appendix B.6) using sample means in 
order to make the interpretation easier.  
 
 
Table 9: Fixed effects regression models for adult and 
juvenile offenders 
VATP Sex 
Offences 
Robbery Property 
Crime 
Adult Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1) 0.02 -0.02 -0.02* -0.16*** 
Adult Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1) -0.16*** -0.13*** 0.06* -0.12** 
Adult Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1) -0.05** -0.02** 0.0015 0.03 
Adult Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1) -0.03* 0.005 0.0002 0.06* 
Adult Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence (t-1) -0.09*** -0.01 0.02 0.02 
Juvenile Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1) -0.003 -0.02 -0.06** 0.009 
Juvenile Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1) -0.03** 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Juvenile Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1)    -0.005 
Juvenile Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1)    -0.02*** 
Police Officers’ Salaries -0.005 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Unemployment -0.12** -0.08 -0.39* -0.14*** 
Youth (15 – 24) -0.2 -0.27 1.26** 0.34* 
Fixed Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 462 462 462 462 
R^2 (within) 0.74 0.4 0.51 0.9 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people. Coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. 
Results are converted to elasticity form using sample means from the level-
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level results reported in the Appendix B.6. Robust Standard errors are 
reported in the Appendix B.6. 
 
The results for adult and juvenile offenders show that community sentences 
are more effective on adult than on juvenile offenders when it comes to 
addressing property crime. In our main specification, the effect was negative 
and significant for robbery and property crimes. However, while holding for 
the adult offenders for both crime types, the results lose significance for 
robbery for juvenile offenders. Results differ when it comes to custody. In our 
main specification, custody showed a negative effect on violence, sexual 
offences and property crime.  The effects for these crimes are the same for 
adult offenders. But for juvenile offenders only custody for violence against 
the person has any significant impact, and the effect on sex offences and 
property crime becomes insignificant. 
 
On the other hand, the conviction rate for the custody for adult offenders 
now has a positive and significant effect on robbery offences showing that a 
1% increase in the conviction rate for the custody would increase robbery rate 
by 0.06%. Once offenders are separated by adults and juveniles the 
alternatives to custody show more impact on the violent crimes. In the main 
specification, only custody was significant. For adult offenders taken 
separately, however, the conviction rates of the conditional discharge, fines 
and suspended sentence became negative and significant showing that the 
increase of a 1% of those conviction rates would lower the crime rate by 
0.05%, 0.03% and 0.09% respectively. Overall, these results show, like our 
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main model, that alternatives to custody can work effectively to reduce crime. 
In addition, adult and juvenile offenders react differently to changes in 
sentencing. Whilst none of the results became significant for juvenile 
offenders from what was already significant in the main specification, there 
were changes for adult offenders where more alternatives to custody 
sentencing became significant for reducing crime rates. 
 
3.7 Robustness checks 
 
3.7.1 Impact of financial crisis on the crime-sentencing relationship 
 
For robustness analysis, we want to check whether our model coefficients are 
stable when we consider the possible implication of the financial crisis in 2008 
– 2009.  Campos et al (2010) investigates the impact of the recession on 
people’s lives at a regional level in the UK.  They find that unemployment 
levels were adversely affected by the recession at different times and each area 
with West Midlands and North West regions having the largest rises in the 
unemployment rate. While redundancy rate rose across all English regions, 
workforce jobs decreased and the rate of change of basic earnings fell 
continuously, criminal justice agencies faced significant budget cuts and the 
Coalition government’s 2010 spending review called for police budgets to be 
reduced by 20 per cent (Millie and Bulllock, 2012). Budget cuts led to 
widespread debate by public and politicians regarding what is realistically 
expected of the police and what they can actually deliver. Government 
emphasised “Big Society” project – political ideology where a significant 
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amount of responsibility for how our society runs is devolved to local 
communities and volunteers - that the private sector, volunteers and 
community groups would step up to fill any void. Therefore, post-recession 
years proved to be particularly challenging for the police services. With rising 
unemployment, falling incomes and lower police budgets, they were asked to 
deliver the same level of service to the public.  
 
In order to test if our model’s results are robust to including the impact of the 
financial crisis, we include a dummy variable for post-recession years (>2007) 
and interactions of all explanatory variables with that dummy and the rest as 
before: 
 
CrimeRatei,t = βX + ℴ1RecessionDummy + ℴ2RecessionDummy*X + σi + εi,t 
 
All variables are the same as in the main model stated above. X defines a set 
of explanatory variables as before. Recession dummy is set to be equal to 0 
for years up to 2008 and from 2008 it is set to be equal to 1. We would 
interpret ℴ as a level shift change in crime, for example, a positive coefficient 
would show that there was a level increase in crime in post-recession years.  
 
Appendix B.7 contains detailed results of the empirical models tested above. 
The recession dummy itself is positive and significant for all crime categories, 
which implies that crime rate has experienced a level shift as a result of 
financial crisis. Most of the interaction dummies for various sentencing types 
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are not statistically significant suggesting that marginal impact of various 
sentencing types does not vary across different phases of the business cycle. 
The signs and size of the main coefficients when compared to our main 
models for violent and property crimes do not change much with the 
conviction rate for custody showing a negative impact on crime for all violent 
crimes and the conviction rate for community sentence showing a negative 
effect on robbery and property crimes. 
 
3.7.2 Lagged specification 
 
We changed the contemporaneous socio-economic variables in the main 
model to the one period lagged values of these variables and estimated a new 
model in a form of: 
 
CrimeRatei,t = β1CommunitySenti,t-1 + β2Custodyi,t-1 + β3ConditionalDischargei,t-1 + 
β4Finei,t-1 + β5SuspendedSentencei,t-1 + β8PoliceOfficersSalariesi,t-1 + β9Unempli,t-1+ 
β9Youthi,t-1  + σi + µt + εi,t 
 
All variables are the same as in the main model stated above. This specification 
addresses the potential issue of these variables affecting crime rate with a lag. 
The results are similar to the main results reported earlier (detailed results are 
available in the Appendix B.8). The impact of community sentences remains 
significant. Robbery and property crimes both have negative and significant 
effects of -0.11% and -0.22% respectively. The conviction rate for custody 
remains significant for violence against the person (-.21%), sexual offences (-
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0.12%) and property crime (-0.14%). However, it remains positive but 
becomes insignificant for robbery.  Fines remain significant for property crime 
with a coefficient of 0.06% suggesting they are an ineffective way of reducing 
property crime. Conditional discharge remains negative and significant for 
sexual offences (-0.02%). On the whole, results are similar to our main 
findings and community sentences remain significant for particular offence 
types. 
3.7.3 Cross crime sentencing effects 
 
Criminologists identify a few types of crime displacement that can take place 
(Barr and Pease, 1990; Gabor, 1981). One of them is when criminals decide 
to shift to another type of crime when a crime control program is 
implemented. It suggests that higher conviction rates for one crime type can 
shift offenders from one crime type to another. On the other hand there is a 
counter-argument that in fact there is very little displacement and instead 
crime control programmes have a general crime lowering or ‘diffusion effect’. 
In our new model10, the explanatory variables for each crime category are 
conviction rates for sentencing for all other crime types but the one tested.  
 
Full results table is reported in the Appendix B.10. For violence against the 
person, our findings suggest that a 1% increase in the conviction rate for 
custody and suspended sentence for sex offences, would reduce the crime rate 
                                                             
10 Appendix B.9 
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by 0.06% and 0.03% respectively. However, the same increase in the 
conviction rate for fines for property crime, would increase it by 0.07%.  
 
For sex offences, the conviction rate for suspended sentence for violence 
against the person has a positive and significant effect of 0.06% if it was 
increased by 1%. This suggests that if more suspended sentences were issued 
for violent crimes, there would be more sex offences recorded a year later. 
Also, a 1% increase in the conviction rate for the community sentence for 
robbery offences and the conviction rate for the suspended sentence for the 
property crime both have a negative and significant effect reducing sex 
offences rate by 0.04% and 0.1% respectively. 
 
For robbery, a 1% increase in the conviction rates for community sentences 
(as well as conditional discharges for sex offences) could lower the robbery 
rate as both have negative and significant effects of -0.09% and -0.03% 
respectively. Also, the conviction rate for the community sentence for 
property crime has a negative and significant effect on the robbery rate which 
suggests that if more community sentences were issued for property crime last 
year, less robbery offences were recorded this year. This finding is also true in 
the reverse, or in other words, the relationship between conviction rate for 
the community sentence for robbery offences and the property crime rate is 
also negative and significant. Hence, it suggests that more community 
sentences for robbery in the previous would lead to less property crime 
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recorded the next year. The conviction rates for conditional discharges and 
fines for the property crime both have positive and significant effect on the 
robbery rate showing that an increase of 1% would result in 0.27% more 
robbery offences recorded for the conditional discharge and 0.22% more for 
the fines. In our main model we found that the conviction rate for fines for 
property crimes had a positive and significant effect on property crime rate. 
This analysis also shows that issuing more fines for property crimes could lead 
to an increase in other crime rates as well. This suggest fines have an 
unfavourable impact, causing more crimes of other categories as a result. 
 
For property crime, a 1% increase of the conviction rate for the custody for 
the violence against the person offences would reduce property crime rate by 
0.12%, a 1% increase of the conviction rate for the suspended sentence for 
sex offences would decrease it by 0.02% and a 1% increase in the conviction 
rate for the community sentence for robbery would reduce it by 0.02%. Also, 
a 1 % increase of the conviction rate for the suspended sentence for the 
robbery offences has a positive and significant effect of 0.01%. The effects of 
socio-economic variables remain consistent with the findings in our main 
model. These results suggest that criminals can indeed change what type of 
crime they choose to commit, however, at the same time higher conviction 
rates for other crime categories (barring fines) can deter offenders from 
committing other types of offences, suggesting more of a diffusion than 
displacement effect in general.  
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3.8 Discussion 
 
 
Our results suggest that while custody is an effective way of reducing crime it 
is not the only way to do so. Also, it is important to note that custody can 
sometimes have a detrimental effect on crime. In our study robbery has a 
positive and significant relationship with the adult conviction rate for custody 
suggesting that, in fact, the robbery rate increases if more offenders are 
sentenced to custody. This shows that criminogenic effects for adult offenders 
in custody for robbery might be stronger than for violence against the person, 
sex offences and property crime. For them custody had a negative impact on 
the crime rate. Alternative sentences such as community sentence and 
conditional discharge also reduced crime rates for all three violent crimes 
(property crime here is an exception as fines for adult offenders had a positive 
effect on crime rates) suggesting that crime can be reduced by routes other 
than prison. In order to illustrate how a 1% increase in the conviction rate 
affects total number of offences we have calculated the following for the adult 
offenders based on the recorded crime in the UK in 2014: 
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Table 10: Number of offences of violent crimes could be changed by 
changing the type of sentencing issued by 1 per cent 
Offence type Violence 
Against 
the Person 
Robbery Sexual 
Offences 
Total number of offences 
recorded by the police (by adult 
offenders) 
720833 48585 78609 
Estimated change in a number 
of offences after 1% increase in 
custody11 
 
-1153 
 
+29 
 
-102 
Estimated change in a number 
of offences after 1% increase in 
community sentence 
 
 
 
-10 
 
Estimated change in a number 
of offences after 1% increase in 
conditional discharge 
 
-360 
  
-16 
Estimated change in a number 
of offences after 1% increase in 
suspended sentence 
 
-649 
 
  
 
We can see, for Violence Against the Person, that more than 1000 offences 
would be prevented if there was a 1% increase in the conviction rate for 
custody (for adult offenders). However, almost the same number of offences 
could be prevented if there was 1% increase in conditional discharges and 1% 
increase in suspended sentences. For robbery, no such impact from additional 
sentencing is found. This could reflect its economic motivation in contrast to 
                                                             
11 All these estimated are based on the data for 2013-2014 crime trends from 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulleti
ns/crimeinenglandandwales/2015-04-23 and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399379/youth-justice-annual-stats-13-14.pdf  
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other violent crimes. 98% of sexual offence convictions result from crimes 
committed by adult offenders. Increases in both custody and conditional 
discharges prevent further offences. However, a 1% increase in the conviction 
rate for custody for adult offenders prevents over six times more offences 
than 1% increase in the conviction rate for conditional discharge. 
 
Table 11 below illustrates estimated effects of sentencing 1% more adult 
offenders to custody and community sentence in terms of prevented offences. 
 
Table 11: Number of offences of property crimes could be changed by 
changing the type of sentencing issued by 1 per cent 
Property Crime Custody Community Sentence 
 
Estimated change in a 
number of offences12 
 
 
-2693 
 
-3590 
Note: Estimated impact of sentencing 1 per cent more offenders to each 
sentence type on number of recorded crimes in 2014 for adult offenders 
 
While both community sentence and custody are effective at reducing 
property crime, community sentence are more effective. These illustrative 
findings suggest that while prison can work in combating illegal activities for 
certain crime types, alternatives to custody can also achieve that while costing 
much less. 
                                                             
12 All these estimated are based on the data for 2013-2014 crime trends from 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulleti
ns/crimeinenglandandwales/2015-04-23 and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399379/youth-justice-annual-stats-13-14.pdf 
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3.9 Conclusion  
 
This study explores the question of whether and which alternatives to custody 
can substitute for incarceration. We focus on England and Wales, a region 
with one of the highest prison populations in Europe and where recent policy 
has tried to reduce reliance on incarceration. We identify a hitherto unused 
dataset on sentencing practice at the Police Force Area level. This is in 
contrast both to other studies that focus on aggregate measures such as prison 
population to measure variation in sentencing regimes, and to individual-level 
studies that are unable to explore the impact of different sentencing 
approaches on a population of offenders and the general public.  
 
We find that for some offence types, there are credible alternatives to custody 
that are either superior or approximately equivalent to a prison sentence in 
terms of impact on the local crime rate. However, what that alternative is 
depends on the type of offence and, also, whether the offender is adult or 
juvenile. Since custody typically costs more than alternatives (besides the 
significant social disadvantages), our results suggest that there is scope to 
provide for public protection through the criminal justice system more 
efficiently and humanely than the status quo. The results also suggest that 
policies implementing alternatives to custody in the United Kingdom have 
already produced moderate success in terms of offering credible alternatives 
to sentencing judges, even though they have not yet significantly reduced 
reliance on incarceration as a criminal justice strategy. 
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4. Does Community Resolution reduce reoffending?  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A growing body of research on the effects of criminalisation13 coupled with 
demands on law enforcement and prison agencies has led to recent extensions 
of the use of professional judgement-led forms of justice. Community 
Resolution provides an opportunity for the police to deal with appropriate 
low offences and offenders. As stated in the Guidelines on the use of Community 
Resolutions (CR) Incorporating Restorative Justice (RJ) “A Community Resolution is 
the nationally recognised term for the resolution of a less serious offence or 
anti-social behaviour incident, where an offender has been identified, through 
informal agreement between the parties involved as opposed to progression 
through the traditional criminal justice process”.  CR allows the police to make 
decisions about how to deal more proportionately with lower level crimes and 
it is focused at first time offenders who showed genuine remorse, and where 
the victim (if there is one) has agreed that the police do not take more formal 
action. The form in which CR could take place would include a simple 
apology, an offer of compensation for the damage caused or a promise to 
clear up criminal damage. It offers victims an informal and flexible response 
to the crime they have reported and it allows victims to have a say in how it is 
dealt with. This is in line with the understanding that some victims want a 
simple outcome to the matter they reported which does not involve formal 
                                                             
13 See Andersen (2015), Cid (2009), Drago et al. (2009) 
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criminal justice processing. At the same time Community Resolutions allow 
offenders to correct their mistakes without suffering the consequences of a 
criminal record which could strongly affect future life chances. It provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the impact they have caused on victims, make amends 
and learn from the experience on just how close they were to facing a full 
judicial process. Also, whilst CR does not result in a criminal record on the 
Police National Computer, it is still recorded on police information systems 
and a previous case of CR would be taken into account if further offences 
were committed. The potential benefits of this approach are both short run 
in nature (short investigation, lower police costs) as well as more long-term 
(reduced long-term offending e.g. a disposal such as CR avoids the so-called 
criminogenic effect that prison entails (Killas et al., 2010, Nieuwbeerta et al., 
2009)).  
 
It is important to note that while CR can incorporate a spectrum of activities 
including restorative justice, it does not mean that every CR incorporates the 
use of restorative justice. The main difference between the two is that while 
CR is appropriate for low level offences, restorative justice can be appropriate 
with more serious crime when used alongside prosecution and/or appropriate 
sentence including prison. In other words, restorative justice is not a disposal14 
(while CR is) and can be used at any stage of the criminal justice system 
alongside or as part of a sentence for any level of crime. There is evidence that 
                                                             
14Disposal means an out of court police disposal which is a way of dealing with less serious 
offending by the police. 
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these terms are sometimes used incorrectly by interchanging the terms 
community resolution and restorative justice (see Wesmarland et al., 2018) 
and an article on Restorative Justice Council website15) which can mislead the 
public. 
 
In short, Community Resolutions provide the police with a timely and 
effective way to deal with lower level crime and anti-social incidents reported. 
However, one of the other benefits of CRs as listed in the Guidelines on the use 
of Community Resolutions (CR) Incorporating Restorative Justice (RJ) is the reduction 
of the likelihood of reoffending by encouraging offenders to face up to the 
impact of their actions and to take responsibility for making good the harm 
caused.  
 
In this chapter we use data collected by Norfolk and Suffolk Police on case 
disposals from 2010 to 2014, with the aim of evaluating the effectiveness of 
CR when compared to other forms of police outcomes such as cautions, being 
charged, being issued with a warning or penalty notice. In order to do that, we 
analyse the effect of CR on overall reoffending rates and on time to 
reoffending (for 4 different time intervals). We compare reoffending rates of 
the offenders for whom CR is the outcome recorded by the police to other 
outcomes for ‘similar’ offences and offenders. According to the latest 
                                                             
15 https://restorativejustice.org.uk/news/community-resolution-and-restorative-justice 
(accessed 14th March 2019) 
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publication on proven reoffending by the Ministry of Justice National 
Statistics16, reoffending rates remain high in the UK for both adult and 
juvenile offenders. Therefore, it is important to understand what works and 
where. In particular, if CR works, this would reduce reoffending rates and 
potentially reduce the need for prison. 
 
The methodology we employ is a well-known quasi-experimental design called 
Propensity Score Matching which is widely used in the criminology literature. 
Propensity Score Matching has been used to look at other criminal justice 
outcomes e.g. whether prison based education affects recidivism (Kim and 
Clark, 2013, Lichtenberger, 2007, Gaes, 2008), how custody impacts 
reoffending (Jolliffe and Hedderman, 2015), the impact of substance use and 
drinking on future crime rates for young people (Craig et al., 2015, Slade et 
al., 2008) and the relationship between gang membership and violent 
victimization (Gibson et al, 2009). In this analysis we use it to test whether 
community resolution affects reoffending rates. We then further analyse the 
impact of CR on recidivism by employing a survival analysis method. It 
controls for the amount of at-risk time each offender had while in community 
as we are using the actual date of when recidivism took place as the outcome 
variable. Since the time to reoffence is an interest of this study, we took the 
length of at-risk time into consideration and conducted a survival analysis 
                                                             
16 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/676431
/proven-reoffending-bulletin-jan16-mar16.pdf 
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where offenders who were matched using the PSM method were analysed in 
the proportional hazard ratio model (Cox regression). It addressed the issue 
of how quickly matched groups reoffended after having their first offence 
recorded. Our findings show that CR can significantly reduce reoffending 
rates and time to reoffending.  
 
4.2 Related Literature 
 
Recidivism and effective ways to prevent recidivism have been a topic to 
explore by social scientists, criminologists and law specialists for many years. 
Whilst Community Resolutions are not widely explored in the literature yet 
(apart from Wesmarland et al., 2018) which focuses on out of court 
resolutions in policing domestic violence and abuse in the United Kingdom) 
there are studies exploring the impact of other sentencing types and various 
treatments received by the offenders on their reoffending rates. There are 
studies that use panel level data (Abramovaite et al., 2018, Durlauf and Nagin, 
2010, Vieratis et al., 2007, Saridakis and Spengler, 2012) to analyse various 
effects on crime rates and there are studies that use individual level data. 
Propensity Score Matching and Survival Analysis methods are both widely 
used in the later. 
  
Jolliffe and Hedderman (2015) used a dataset of 5,500 male offenders from 1 
of 10 regions in the United Kingdom to investigate the impact of custody on 
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reoffending using propensity score matching. Their results suggest that 1 year 
after release offenders who had been sent to prison were significantly more 
likely to have committed another (proven offence).  In Netherlands, Wermink 
et al. (2010) used longitudinal official record data on 4,246 adult offenders to 
compare recidivism for a period up to eight years after community service to 
that after short-term prison sentence. By controlling for a large set of 
confounding variables and using matching method they show that offenders 
reoffend significantly less after having received community service compared 
to after having been imprisoned. Their results are robust for both the short 
and long term.  
  
However, some slightly older studies did not always find similar support for 
community sentences. Smith and Akers (1993) analysed recidivism of 
Florida’s Community Control and prison using survival analysis. They used a 
small sample of male offenders from Community Control and prison who 
were matched on four covariates, however, both groups differed significantly 
on race and prior felonies, with the prison group having a larger proportion 
of non-white offenders and offenders with prior felonies. Their findings show 
that recidivism rates and survival curves of both groups were essentially the 
same and around 4 out of 6 offenders sentenced to Community Control or 
prison reoffended during the five year study. Wesiburd et al. (1995) examined 
the impact of sanctions on the criminal careers of 742 offenders convicted of 
white-collar crimes in seven US district courts between 1976 and 1978. They 
matched prison and non-prison groups in terms of factors that led to them 
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receiving a prison sentence such as criminal history or crime arrested for and 
personal circumstances. They found that both groups had no significant 
difference in reoffending rates in the 126 months follow up period. 
  
There are also a number of studies (Saylor and Gaes, 1997, Lichternberger, 
2007, Kim and Clark, 2013) which focus on work experience and/or 
educational training whilst in custody and on how it affects reoffending once 
released from prison. 
  
Sayor and Gaes (1997) used data collected by the Post-Release Employment 
Project in the US which was designed to evaluate the impact of any work 
related training or work experience on an offender’s behaviour following 
release from prison. Data were collected from 1983 till October 1987 on over 
7,000 offenders. They have looked at several behavioural outcomes including 
long term reoffending and found that offenders who were in prison and 
worked there were 24 percent less likely to reoffend throughout the 
observation period (reoffending data were collected in 1995 meaning that 
follow up data on reoffending data ranged from 8 to 12 years depending on 
release date) and those who participated in either vocational or apprenticeship 
training were 33 percent less likely to reoffend. 
 
Lichtenberger (2007) matched offenders from the fiscal year 1999, 2000, 2001 
and 2002 release cohorts on their marital status, offence type, custody code at 
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release and other eight characteristics to observe if there is any difference on 
vocational programs in Virginia on post-release outcomes for full completers. 
He used propensity score model to match non-participants to the vocational 
completers and compared their earnings. At the end of study period (fiscal 
year release cohorts 1999 – 2002 combined) earnings of the full completers 
were almost 24 per cent higher than those of control group. 
  
Kim and Clark (2013) in their study on the effect of prison-based college 
education programs in New York State on reoffending focus on self-selection 
bias when measuring recidivism and, therefore, are using Propensity Score 
Matching method to control for it. They find that the reoffending rates are 
significantly lower for the offenders who completed college program and that 
reoffending rate for a comparison group which was not derived using the PSM 
method was more than double the rate which was derived using the PSM 
method. This finding highlights the need to use appropriate techniques to 
control for selection-bias when measuring the effect of education programs 
on recidivism.  
 
Other studies utilised PSM or Survival Analysis to analyse a range of questions 
in crime literature.  
Craig et al. (2015) used PSM to estimate the impact of heavy drinking on 
criminal convictions occurring in early adulthood. Using data from England 
and Wales with dependant variable being conviction rates and primary 
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independent variable being heavy drinking authors found that heavy drinkers 
were significantly more likely to be convicted for crimes in early adulthood 
when compared to those who did not engage in heavy drinking. Cloyes et al. 
(2010) utilised survival analysis to demonstrate a significant difference in 
return rates and community tenure for offenders in Utah State with serious 
mental illness compared to offenders without serious mental illness when 
controlling for demographics, condition of release, offence type and condition 
of return. Baglivio et al. (2014) used PSM to compare the effectiveness of 
Multisystemic Therapy with Functional Family Therapy using a multiyear state 
wide sample of juvenile offenders. Both therapies are designed to help youth 
to function better at their homes, schools and communities. They used data 
on 2,312 juvenile offenders drawn from Florida Department of Juvenile 
Justice and one of the outcome variables used was reoffending rates within 12 
months. They report few significant differences in the effectiveness of both 
therapies. Ostermann (2015) used Cox proportional hazards survival tests to 
analyse the post release performance of former inmates who were released 
from a prison in New Jersey in 2006. Results indicated that after around 3 
years after release, those who were released to supervision were involved in 
less new crimes when compared to those who were released unconditionally. 
However, there was still a high proportion of those released to supervision 
who reoffended shortly after their release and the predicted probability on 
recidivism did not differ substantially between both release groups. 
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4.3 Propensity Score Matching 
 
The main purpose of this analysis is to learn whether or not community 
resolution as a police outcome on offenders has any negative (reducing) effect 
on further offending by those offenders. Whilst checking the overall rates of 
those who received community resolution and comparing it those who did 
not is a good starting point, it is unlikely to capture the unbiased effect. The 
decision to receive community resolution for particular offender can be 
influenced by many factors such as his/her age, offence committed, 
employment status and more. These factors could also influence offender’s 
future decision whether to reoffend or not. Therefore, by simply comparing 
reoffending rates for those who received community resolution and ones who 
did not, we would absorb the result of all other factors influencing his/her 
decision to commit another offence and not a pure effect of receiving 
community resolution. In order to overcome this issue usually a randomised 
experimental design would be a preferred way – one group would be randomly 
assigned to the community resolution and another one to the alternative 
police outcome. Then we could simply compare the outcome (reoffending 
rate) for both groups and see if there is any significant difference. However, 
in reality this kind of experimental design is difficult to implement especially 
in crime studies as decisions on sentences issued by the justice system are not 
done on random basis. As an alternative, instead of exercising physical control 
over the treatment conditions as in the case in the randomized environment, 
we can exercise statistical control over the conditions by selecting a group that 
has similar characteristics to the treatment group (Apel and Sweeten, 2010). 
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This can be achieved by utilising a Propensity Score Matching method which 
allows us to form a control group which is statistically similar to the group 
which received the treatment which in our case is community resolution. To 
understand the propensity score matching, it is important to mention the 
analysis known as potential outcomes (Rubin, 1974). According to this 
framework, the causal effect of a binary treatment is the difference between 
an individual’s value of the response variable when he/she received the 
treatment and that same individual’s value of the response variable when 
he/she has not received the treatment (Apel and Sweeten, 2010). Then, the 
same individual experiences a response under two simultaneous conditions. 
The main problem of causal inference is that for each individual you can only 
observe one of the two potential outcomes at any given time. Therefore, it is 
impossible to make a direct estimation of the causal effect of treatment 
received. 
 
As explained by Apel and Sweeten (2010) the goal of treatment effect 
estimation is to input hypothetical values for these missing counterfactuals 
which are the potential outcome if no treatment is received in the treated 
sample the potential outcome of the treatment in untreated sample 
(formalised approach based on Apel and Sweeten (2010) is shown in 
Appendix C.1). They explain that the underlying issue for estimation of the 
causal effect of treatments is ensuring that treated individuals are statistically 
equivalent to untreated individuals on all background factors that are relevant 
for estimating the causal effect of interest. If that is achieved then the 
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treatment is considered to be exogenous, meaning that it is independent of 
the potential outcomes. The problem arises when treatment is endogenous 
and has an effect on the potential outcomes. In the community resolution and 
reoffending example, individuals who are willing to apologise or pay for the 
damages they have caused to the victims might have a variety of other 
characteristics that are correlated with a lower chance of reoffending such as 
better income or employment prospects, or be different in ways that are more 
difficult to observe and measure such as life ambitions, desire to make amends 
with others, how important family’s and friends’ opinions are to them or 
orientation to family life. Therefore, the main goal of causal treatment effect 
estimation is to deal with endogeneity as far as possible. As mentioned earlier, 
randomization of treatment is not always possible to achieve, therefore 
researchers strive to achieve statistical control over treatment in a way that 
approximates to conditions of randomization. It can be done by choosing a 
counterfactual group of untreated individuals who closely resemble the 
individuals who received the treatment as measured by a number of potential 
confounding variables. Propensity score matching allows us to select a 
subsample of individuals who received and have not received a treatment that 
are observationally similar so that valid treatment effect estimated can be 
calculated. Rooted in the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985) and 
can be defined as the conditional probability of assignment to a particular 
treatment given a vector of observed covariates. Propensity score matching 
differs from standard regression by not relying on a linear functional form to 
estimate treatment effects and it highlights the issue of common support.  
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Since we believe that police were not issuing community resolutions on a 
random basis, in this analysis we use Propensity score matching method for 
constructing a comparison group and then we estimate the Average 
Treatment Effect which shows the effect of community resolution on 
reoffending rates.  
 
4.4 Data 
 
This analysis uses an individual-level dataset compiled by Norfolk and Suffolk 
police during the years 2010 to 2014. It includes information on offender 
characteristics such as gender, age at first offence, ethnicity, employment 
status, nationality. It also includes details about the crime they have 
committed, what was the police outcome and, if they reoffended, when it 
happened. There are 18767 offences recorded in the data set compiled by 
police with all offences listed separately with each offender being given a 
unique code. We recategorised data to be listed by each offender and not the 
offence. If we kept the data for the offences which were multiples for the 
reoffence, we would have skewed the data and made the effect of the 
treatment larger as the same offender who committed more than one offence 
would have been matched with a counterfactual multiple times. Therefore, 
our new dataset consists of 7679 observations (of offenders), 631 of whom 
received community resolution as the police outcome.  
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Reoffending 
The outcome variable in this analysis is reoffending. It is measured by any 
arrest for a crime occurring after the first offence. The reoffending outcome 
is a binary variable coded 0 for those who were not re-arrested and 1 for those 
who were re-arrested. Also, we calculated the difference in days between the 
first offence and the first reoffence for those offenders who committed more 
than one offence. Then we categorised them as “Reoffended within 30 days”, 
“Reoffended within 90 days” and “Reoffended within 180 days”17 and all 
these variables were binary with offenders with no reoffences or who 
reoffended after more than 30, 90 or 180 days respectively coded 0 and those 
who committed another offence within those given days coded 1. 
Community Resolution (Treatment) 
In this analysis treatment is community resolution as a police outcome 
received by offenders. It is coded as a binary variable, 0 for those with no 
community resolution as a police outcome, and 1 for those with community 
resolution as a police outcome. 
Covariates18  
Gender 
                                                             
17 It is a usual practice to measure reoffence with a certain follow up period, by the 
definition “A reoffence is defined as any offence committed in a three month follow-up 
period that resulted in a court conviction or caution in the three month follow up with a 
further three month waiting period” Ministry of Justice, 2015. 
18 Appendix C.2 illustrates descriptive statistics of four covariates listed below 
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Gender of an offender as identified in the police records. It is coded as a 
binary variable, 0 for male offenders, and 1 for female offenders. 
Age 
Age of an offender at first offence as identified in the police records. 
Ethnicity 
Ethnicity of an offender where identified in the police records. It is coded as 
a binary variable, 0 for white offenders, and 1 for non-white offenders. 
Employment Status 
Employment status of an offender where identified in the police records. It is 
coded as a binary variable, 0 for unemployed offenders, and 1 for employed. 
Current Crime 
Crime committed was also identified in the police records for each offence. 
Since police had no set categories of crime descriptions, we utilised word 
search commands and categorised most crimes into 4 main categories which 
came across as the most used. We then created binary variables if offence 
description contained the word assault, theft, criminal damage or harassment. 
We started by matching the treatment and control group samples and then 
checking if matching made differences between them insignificant.  Table 12 
below shows the descriptive statistics of the matched and unmatched samples. 
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We can see from the table results that matching leads to both groups 
(treatment and control) having similar characteristics. Means of matched and 
unmatched groups are presented on the left of the table and we can see how 
close the characteristics between treatment and control groups after the 
Table 12 Descriptive Statistics of Matched and Unmatched Samples 
Variable  
Description   
                 
Reoffendin
g  
Police record of one more arrest after committing first offence 
(0 = no, 1 = yes)       
Treatment  
Receiving Community Resolution as police outcome 
(0 = no, 1 = yes)        
                 
         Mean               
       
Unmatche
d   
Matche
d       
              t-test   
       Treated Control  Treated 
Cont
rol 
%bias 
reduction 
%b
ias t p>|t| 
Sociodemographic                
Gender  
0 = Male, 1 = 
Female  0.25 0.15  0.25 0.24 98.2 0.4 0.07 0.95 
Ethnicity  
0 = White, 1 = 
Non-White  0.05 0.07  0.05 0.05 92.8 -0.7 -0.13 0.89 
Age at the first 
offence 
Age at 
admission   24.3 29.4  24.3 24.3 99.7 -0.1 -0.02 0.99 
Employme
nt  
0 = unemployed, 1 = 
employed 0.59 0.62  0.59 0.57 32.8 3.6 0.63 0.53 
                 
Current crime               
Assault  
0 = no,  1 = 
yes   0.26 0.2  0.26 0.25 82.7 2.3 0.39 0.7 
Criminal 
Damage 
0 = no,  1 = 
yes   0.13 0.08  0.13 0.13 100 0 0 1 
Theft  
0 = no,  1 = 
yes   0.29 0.19  0.29 0.3 95.1 -1.1 -0.19 0.85 
Harassmen
t   
0 = no, 1 = 
yes     0.09 0.06   0.09 0.09 95 -0.6 -0.1 0.92 
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matching are. On the right of the Table 12 the standardized bias after 
matching satisfies the condition to be under 5%. Also, t-tests demonstrate that 
all the differences after matching were not significant, or in other words, these 
groups were balanced in their propensity to receive community resolution. 
Figure 6 below illustrates the matching. 
 
Figure 6 PSM - Matching Covariates Illustration 
 
 
 
 
 
-40 -20 0 20
Standardized % bias across covariates
Age at First Offence
Ethnicity
Employment Status
Harrassment
Assault
Criminal Damage
Gender
Theft
Reoffending
PSM - Matching Covariates Illustration
Unmatched
Matched
101 
 
4.5 PSM Results 
 
4.5.1 Main Results 
 
After successfully matching treatment and control groups, we are using a one-
to-one nearest-neighbour matching method19 with no replacement to calculate 
the average treatment effect of community resolution as a police outcome on 
reoffending rates. There were 620 matched pairs found and Table 14 below 
shows our findings: 
Table 13: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Main Results) 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffending        
  Before Matching 0.42 0.49 -0.077 0.02 -3.6 
  After Matching 0.42 0.52 -0.108 0.03 -3.83 
 
Before matching, the treated group reoffended at the rate of 42% and the 
control group at 49%. After matching, the control group had a reoffending 
rate of 52%. Therefore, after matching we can observe the difference in 
reoffending rates between treated and control groups is -10.8% and is 
statistically significant. This finding shows that community resolution has a 
negative (reducing) effect on the reoffending rates.  
                                                             
19 There are alternative matching criteria, but we have chosen one to one nearest neighbour 
matching to get the closest matches possible to our treatment group. In the large sample all 
matching criteria should provide very similar results and they all choose the best possible 
matches for the sample. 
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On average offenders who committed another offence took 190 days between 
their index offence and their next offence and we are interested in seeing if 
community resolution had any effect on how quickly offenders reoffended. 
Table 14 Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Main Results by 
Reoffending Days) 
       
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffence within 30 days       
  Before Matching 0.003 0.026 -0.023 0.006 -3.55 
  After Matching 0.003 0.031 -0.023 0.007 -3.34 
Reoffence within 90 days       
  Before Matching 0.04 0.07 -0.027 0.01 -2.56 
  After Matching 0.04 0.07 -0.029 0.01 -2.22 
Reoffence within 180 days       
  Before Matching 0.11 0.16 -0.052 0.02 -3.4 
  After Matching 0.11 0.18 -0.069 0.02 -3.51 
Reoffence within 12 months       
  Before Matching 0.35 0.43 -0.082 0.02 -3.9 
  After Matching 0.35 0.45 -0.105 0.03 -3.79 
 
Table 15 shows the average treatment of community resolution on four 
different reoffending intervals before and after matching. The first set of rows 
show the reoffending rate within 30 days of index offence (which is the first 
offence recorded by the police for each offender in our data set). Before and 
after matching the difference between treated and control groups was -2% 
and it is statistically significant (two-tail t test at 0.01 level). The results of 90 
days recidivism intervals are similar. The differences in the reoffending rate 
are -2.7% before matching and -2.9% after matching. They are both 
statistically significant. The next rows in the table show the reoffending rates 
within 180 days of index offence. Before matching, the average recidivism rate 
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for those who did not receive community resolution as police outcome was 
16% while for those who received it was 11%. After matching, the results 
remained very similar and both were statistically significant. In 12 months the 
overall reoffending rate for those who received the treatment before matching 
was 35% and for those who did not was 43%. After matching, those who 
received the treatment reoffended at the rate of 35% while those who did not 
receive the treatment reoffended the rate of 45% which shows a difference of 
10.5% if CR is received. Both results were statistically significant. 
 
Furthermore, we want to establish whether similar results hold across 
different offender profiles, thus we use the same method of matching on 
various subgroups corresponding to different offender profiles within our 
dataset. 
 
4.5.1.1 Male Only Sample 
 
6375 offenders (83%) in our data set were identified as males. Using the same 
method of matching we obtained the average treatment effect for the male 
only sample (Table with descriptive statistics is available in Appendix C.3): 
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Table 15 Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Male Only Sample 
Results) 
       
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffending        
  Before Matching 0.4 0.49 -0.09 0.02 -3.67 
  After Matching 0.4 0.53 -0.126 0.03 -3.89 
 
Table 16 above shows the average treatment effects of CR as police outcome 
on reoffending before and after matching on male sample only.  Before 
matching, the treated group reoffended at the rate of 40% and the control 
group at 49%. After matching, the control group had a reoffending rate of 
53%. The results are consistent with our main findings and show that 
recidivism rates are around 12.6% lower after CR is received as a police 
outcome. 
Table 16: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Male Only 
Sample Results by Reoffending Days)  
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffence within 30 days       
  Before Matching 0.002 0.025 -0.023 0.01 -3.12 
  After Matching 0.002 0.017 -0.015 0.01 -2.35 
Reoffence within 90 days       
  Before Matching 0.041 0.067 -0.026 0.01 -2.17 
  After Matching 0.041 0.062 -0.021 0.01 -1.48 
Reoffence within 180 days       
  Before Matching 0.096 0.16 -0.062 0.02 -3.54 
  After Matching 0.096 0.16 -0.068 0.02 -3.12 
Reoffence within 12 months       
  Before Matching 0.34 0.43 -0.091 0.02 -3.78 
  After Matching 0.34 0.45 -0.115 0.03 -3.63 
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Table 17 above breaks down recidivism into four time intervals. Results are 
mostly significant and indicate a drop in reoffending after CR is received as a 
police outcome. 
 
4.5.1.2 Sample with Employed Only 
 
3154 offenders (41%) in our sample were identified as employed. Using the 
same method of matching, we obtained the average treatment effect for the 
employed only sample (Table with descriptive statistics is available in 
Appendix C.4): 
Table 17: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Employed Only 
Sample Results) 
       
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffending        
  Before Matching 0.36 0.43 -0.073 0.03 -2.68 
  After Matching 0.36 0.44 -0.076 0.04 -2.12 
 
In the employed only sample, treated offenders reoffended less when 
compared to a pulled sample (main findings). Before matching, the treated 
group reoffended at 36% and control group at 43%. After matching control 
group had a reoffending rate of 44%. Before matching, the difference in 
reoffending rates between treated and control groups is 7.3% and after 
matching it is 7.6%. Both are statistically significant. 
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Table 18 Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Employed Only 
Sample Results by Reoffending Days) 
  
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffence within 30 days       
  Before Matching 0.005 0.025 -0.019 0.01 -2.34 
  After Matching 0.005 0.022 -0.016 0.01 -1.91 
Reoffence within 90 days       
  Before Matching 0.038 0.067 -0.029 0.01 -2.16 
  After Matching 0.038 0.054 -0.16 0.02 -1.05 
Reoffence within 180 days       
  Before Matching 0.1 0.145 -0.044 0.02 -2.3 
  After Matching 0.1 0.139 -0.038 0.02 -1.59 
Reoffence within 12 months       
  Before Matching 0.313 0.392 -0.078 0.03 -2.9 
  After Matching 0.313 0.395 -0.082 0.04 -2.32 
 
Results for reoffending at different time intervals are shown in the Table 19 
above.  They show that the same as with our main findings, CR has a negative 
effect on recidivism on employed only sample. 
4.5.1.3 Sample with Unemployed Only 
 
1960 offenders (26%) in our sample were identified as unemployed. The 
results for the average treatment effect for the unemployed sample only are 
presented in Table 19 below (Table with descriptive statistics is available in 
Appendix C.5): 
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Table 19: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Unemployed 
Only Sample Results) 
   
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffending        
  Before Matching 0.5 0.59 -0.092 0.03 -2.78 
  After Matching 0.5 0.63 -0.134 0.04 -3.07 
 
Treated groups before and after matching had an overall rate of reoffending 
of 50%. Control group before matching had a reoffending rate of 59% and 
after matching it was 63%. These numbers are higher than for main findings 
and employed only sample suggesting that recidivism is higher amongst the 
unemployed offenders. The difference in reoffending between two groups 
before matching was 9.2% and after matching it was 13.4%. Both were 
statistically significant. These findings show that community resolution can be 
an effective way to reduce reoffending. 
Table 20: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Unemployed 
Only Sample Results by Reoffending Days) 
   
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffence within 30 days       
  Before Matching 0 0.029 -0.029 0.01 -2.74 
  After Matching 0 0.028 -0.028 0.01 -2.68 
Reoffence within 90 days       
  Before Matching 0.047 0.072 -0.024 0.02 -1.43 
  After Matching 0.047 0.079 -0.031 0.02 -1.46 
Reoffence within 180 days       
  Before Matching 0.12 0.19 -0.067 0.03 -2.62 
  After Matching 0.12 0.23 -0.111 0.03 -3.31 
Reoffence within 12 months       
  Before Matching 0.4 0.49 -0.095 0.03 -2.83 
  After Matching 0.4 0.53 -0.126 0.04 -2.87 
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Table 21 above contains results on reoffending at different time intervals. No 
unemployed offenders who received CR as a police outcome reoffended in 
the first 30 days. Overall, these findings are consistent with our results for the 
whole sample and most are statistically significant.  
 
4.5.1.4 Sample with Juvenile Offenders Only 
 
In our data set 1317 offenders (17%) were aged below 18. Descriptive 
statistics of unmatched and matched samples is available in Appendix C.6. 
Table 21 below presents the findings for the average treatment effect for the 
sample of juvenile only: 
Table 21: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Juvenile Only 
Sample Results) 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffending        
  Before Matching 0.43 0.51 -0.083 0.04 -2.27 
  After Matching 0.43 0.48 -0.049 0.04 -1.13 
 
Before and after matching juvenile offenders reoffended at 43% rate. Before 
matching, control group reoffended at 51% rate and after matching at 49% 
rate. The difference before matching was 8% and statistically significant and 
after matching it become 6% and was statistically insignificant. 
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Table 22 Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Juvenile Only 
Sample Results by Reoffending Days) 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffence within 30 days       
  Before Matching 0.004 0.023 -0.02 0.01 -2.04 
  After Matching 0.004 0.019 -0.015 0.01 -1.64 
Reoffence within 90 days       
  Before Matching 0.026 0.057 -0.03 0.02 -1.95 
  After Matching 0.026 0.049 -0.022 0.02 -1.37 
Reoffence within 180 days       
  Before Matching 0.097 0.136 -0.039 0.02 -1.61 
  After Matching 0.097 0.131 -0.034 0.03 -1.22 
Reoffence within 12 months       
  Before Matching 0.36 0.423 -0.063 0.04 -1.75 
  After Matching 0.36 0.397 -0.037 0.04 -0.89 
 
Table 23 above contains results on reoffending at different time intervals. No 
juvenile offenders who received CR as a police outcome reoffended in the 
first 30 days. Overall, findings are consistent with our main results and show 
there is a reduction in recidivism after CR is received as a police outcome, 
however, the differences are lower than – overall the difference in reoffending 
rates after matching after 12 months is around 10% whilst for juveniles it is 
around 5%. 
 
4.5.1.5 Sample with Adult Offenders Only 
 
6362 offenders (83%) in our sample were identified as 18 or over. The results 
for the average treatment effect for the adult only sample are presented in the 
Table 23 below (Table with descriptive statistics is available in Appendix C.7): 
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Table 23: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Adult Only 
Sample Results) 
       
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffending        
  Before Matching 0.41 0.49 -0.084 0.03 -3.05 
  After Matching 0.41 0.59 -0.187 0.04 -5.05 
 
Before and after matching treatment group reoffended at 41% rate. Control 
group before matching were reoffending at the 49% rate and after matching 
at 59% rate. The difference after receiving CR as a police outcome before 
matching was 8.4% and after matching 18.7% showing that CR can have a 
large impact on recidivism rates on adult offenders. Both results were 
statistically significant. 
Table 24: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Adult Only 
Sample Results by Reoffending Days) 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffence within 30 days       
  Before Matching 0.003 0.027 -0.024 0.01 -2.77 
  After Matching 0.003 0.048 -0.045 0.01 -3.85 
Reoffence within 90 days       
  Before Matching 0.054 0.071 -0.017 0.01 -1.22 
  After Matching 0.054 0.076 -0.023 0.02 -1.22 
Reoffence within 180 days       
  Before Matching 0.12 0.16 -0.048 0.02 -2.37 
  After Matching 0.12 0.2 -0.08 0.03 -3.2 
Reoffence within 12 months       
  Before Matching 0.34 0.43 -0.1 0.03 -3.36 
  After Matching 0.34 0.51 -0.17 0.04 -4.63 
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Table 25 above contains results on reoffending at different time intervals. 
Findings are consistent with our main results and show there is a reduction in 
recidivism after CR is received as a police outcome and most are statistically 
significant. 
We now disaggregate by offence type and redo the analysis for each category 
 
4.5.1.6 Sample with Assault Offences Only 
 
1652 offences (22%) in our sample were identified as assault with around 10% 
of them getting a CR as a police outcome. The results for the average 
treatment effect for the assault offences only sample are presented in the 
Table 25 below (Table with descriptive statistics is available in Appendix C.8): 
Table 25: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Assault Only 
Results) 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffending        
  
Before 
Matching 0.37 0.44 -0.075 0.04 -1.78 
  After Matching 0.37 0.43 -0.062 0.05 -1.14 
       
 
Before and after matching the group which received the Community 
Resolution as a police outcome reoffender at 37% rate. Control group 
reoffended at 44% rate before matching and at 43% rate after matching. Both 
results indicated that community resolution would lead to lower reoffending 
rates, however, results were not statistically significant. 
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Table 26: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Assault Only 
Results by Reoffending Days) 
  
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffence within 30 days       
  
Before 
Matching 0 0.02 -0.024 0.01 -2 
  After Matching 0 0.02 -0.025 0.01 -2.02 
Reoffence within 90 days       
  
Before 
Matching 0.03 0.07 -0.035 0.02 -1.71 
  After Matching 0.03 0.07 -0.037 0.02 -1.54 
Reoffence within 180 days       
  
Before 
Matching 0.13 0.16 -0.031 0.03 -1.01 
  After Matching 0.13 0.18 -0.05 0.04 -1.23 
Reoffence within 12 months       
  
Before 
Matching 0.3 0.41 -0.11 0.04 -2.65 
  After Matching 0.3 0.4 -0.106 0.05 -1.99 
 
Table 27 above shows results for reoffending at different time intervals. 
Results are consistent with our main findings and show that there is an 11% 
decrease in reoffending rates within 12 months after CR is received as a police 
outcome. It is also statistically significant. 
 
4.5.1.7 Sample with Theft Offences Only 
 
1664 offences (22%) in our sample were identified as assault with around 11% 
of them getting a CR as a police outcome. The results for the average 
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treatment effect for the theft offences only sample are presented in the Table 
28 below (Table with descriptive statistics is available in Appendix C.9): 
 
Table 27: Average Treatment Effects: Propensity Score Matching (Theft Only 
Results) 
  
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffending        
  Before Matching 0.48 0.6 -0.127 0.04 -3.14 
  After Matching 0.48 0.63 -0.156 0.05 -3.00 
 
Before and after matching offenders who got identified with theft as the 
offence type by the police and received CR as a police outcome reoffended at 
48% rate. Control group before matching reoffender at 60% rate and after 
matching at 63%. It indicates that before matching there was a difference of 
12.7% in reoffending rates and 15.6% after matching. Both results are 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 28: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching (Theft Only 
Results by Reoffending Days) 
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stats 
Reoffence within 30 days       
  Before Matching 0 0.03 -0.029 0.01 -2.33 
  After Matching 0 0.03 -0.033 0.01 -2.48 
Reoffence within 90 days       
  Before Matching 0.04 0.08 -0.039 0.02 -1.84 
  After Matching 0.04 0.06 -0.022 0.02 -0.97 
Reoffence within 180 days       
  Before Matching 0.11 0.18 -0.075 0.03 -2.46 
  After Matching 0.11 0.21 -0.106 0.04 -2.76 
114 
 
Reoffence within 12 months       
  Before Matching 0.41 0.5 -0.096 0.04 -2.34 
  After Matching 0.41 0.52 -0.117 0.05 -2.23 
 
Reoffending rates by different time intervals are consistent with our main 
findings. Reoffending within 12 months is almost 12% lower for those who 
received CR as a police outcome and is statistically significant. 
 
4.6 Survival Analysis 
 
We further analyse the impact of CR on reoffending rates by utilising a 
survival analysis method. Survival analysis model is usually used to analyse the 
survival times, i.e., the time until death, in medical studies. In criminology it is 
widely used (Ostermann, 2015, Kim and Clark, 2013, Cloyes et al., 2010) to 
analyse the time from an individual’s release from prison until his or her 
recidivism. As explained by Chung et al (1991) survival analysis in crime 
studies can yield three types of results – firstly, the survival time analysis model 
will predict the number of individuals who will become recidivists at any 
length of time after release; secondly, using this form of analysis  allows one 
to estimate the effects of observable individual characteristics on time until 
the reoffence takes place; finally, if one of the individual characteristics is a 
dummy variable indicating the attendance or non-attendance in some 
correctional programme (or receiving or not receiving some treatment) which 
is believed to have an effect on future recidivism, holding other observable 
characteristics constant, the survival analysis model can be used to estimate 
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the effect of the program or treatment. This method allows us to control for 
the amount of at-risk time each offender had while in community. Since we 
are interested in when the reoffence took place, this is particularly important.  
 
We used a proportional hazard model (Cox regression, see Cox, 1972) where 
samples matched using the PSM method were analysed to see how quickly the 
treated and control groups reoffended after receiving CR as a police outcome. 
This model allows us to evaluate simultaneously the effect of various factors 
on survival which in this chapter can be interpreted as examining how our 
known covariates influence the rate of reoffending at a particular point in 
time. This rate is known as the hazard rate. A Cox model is expressed by the 
hazard function h(t), which can be described as the risk of reoffending20 at 
time t. It can be estimated as follow: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡) × exp (𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑧𝑥𝑧) 
 
where h(t) is the hazard function which is determined by a set of z covariates 
𝑥1 , 𝑥2,…, 𝑥𝑧 , , the coefficients 𝛽 measure the effect of covariates, t is the 
survival time (time till reoffence), the term ℎ0(𝑡) is called the baseline hazard 
which is the hazard when all covariates are equal to zero. The main 
                                                             
20 Risk of reoffending is a hazard function which is a way to model data distribution in survival 
analysis. In my analysis it is used to model an offender’s chance of reoffence as a function of 
the number of days since their first offence. 
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assumption in the Cox model is the proportional hazards assumption. It 
implies that the hazard ratio (the ratio of the hazard function to the baseline 
hazard) for any two individuals is constant over time. A hazard ratio estimated 
by a Cox proportional hazards model is interpreted as a relative risk which 
implies that hazard ratios higher than 1 show increase in the hazard and hazard 
ratios lower than 1 show decrease in the hazard. 
 
4.6.2 Survival Analysis Results 
 
The matched sample is used for a Cox regression and results are presented in 
Table 28. The model includes a treatment variable, indicating whether or not 
an offender received CR as a police outcome and all other covariates used in 
the PSM analysis. We first tested whether the data satisfy the proportional 
hazards assumption and found that the model was suitable and covariates do 
not have different effects at different points in time. Our findings are 
consistent with our earlier analysis and show that receiving CR decreased the 
risk of reoffending within 12 months from the first offence by nearly 30% 
while holding other covariates constant21. For those who have not reoffended 
after 12 months of their first offence, their survival rate is about 68% for those 
who received CR and 57% for those who did not (Fig 8). Besides the 
treatment (CR) variable, age at the first offence, employment and theft 
variables are also significant in the Cox regression equation. The coefficient 
                                                             
21 1 – 0.71 = 0.29 
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on age is 0.99 which shows that an increase of one year of age, lowers the risk 
of reoffending to by 1%. This finding is consistent with our results in the PSM 
section where we found higher reoffending rates for juvenile offenders and 
smaller average treatment effect of CR when compared to older adult 
offenders. Being employed also reduces the risk of reoffending by about 26% 
which is again consistent with results from the PSM section. Finally, being 
caught for theft (while holding other covariates constant) increased the risk of 
reoffending by 26%. It is also consistent with the PSM findings where theft 
only sample had a higher reoffending rate when compared to the main results 
from the pooled sample.  
 
Table 29: Cox Regression Model Results  
 Haz. Ratio Std. Error 
   
Community Resolution (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 0.71*** 0.002 
Age at the first offence  0.99* 0.03 
Gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 1.01 0.06 
Ethnicity (0 = White, 1 = Non-White) 1.04 0.09 
Employment (0 = Unemployed, 1 = 
Employed) 
0.74*** 0.03 
Assault ((0 = No, 1 = Yes) 1.03 0.06 
Criminal Damage (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 1.14 0.09 
Theft (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 1.26*** 0.07 
Possession (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 1.02 0.08 
Note: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p <0.01  LR chi2 (9) = 88.94 (P<0.001) 
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Figure 7: Cox Proportional Hazards Regression 
 
In summary, we find that Community Resolution can effectively reduce 
reoffending rates. Both modelling approaches used in this chapter show 
consistently positive results i.e. CR reduces both reoffending rates and time 
to reoffend.  Thus, our results suggest that when an offender received CR as 
a police outcome compared to a normal criminal justice procedure, he or she 
would be significantly less likely to reoffend at the later stage. Also, their time 
to reoffend is longer than those who received a non CR police outcome. 
 
Overall, using both approaches – PSM and Survival Analysis – we find that 
Community Resolution has a reducing effect on reoffending. The result is 
consistent and robust when tested on various subsamples. Also, from the 
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survival analysis we know that offenders’ time to reoffend is longer for those 
who received a CR as police outcome. When comparing employed and 
unemployed samples, we find that offenders who were employed and received 
CR reoffended at 36% whilst those who were unemployed and received CR 
reoffended at 50%. However, the average treatment effect for unemployed 
sample was over 13% while for employed sample it was just below 8%. 
Furthermore, we find that the average treatment effect for juvenile offenders 
was smaller at just over 4% (when compared to the main results) and 
statistically insignificant while for adult offenders it was almost 19% and 
statistically significant. This finding suggest that CR works better on adult 
offenders and is in line with what rational theory posits, where an individual 
would choose activities in the illegal sector if their reward is higher than in the 
legal sector. On average young people earn less than their older counterparts 
which would explain their higher reoffending rates and the smaller average 
treatment effect of CR. 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Community Resolutions were introduced in 2009 and provide police with a 
timely and effective way to deal with lower level crime and anti-social incidents 
reported. The goal of the analysis in this chapter is to use a unique, individual 
level dataset for Norfolk and Suffolk Police Force Areas for low level 
offenders to examine the effectiveness of Community Resolution on 
recidivism by employing a Propensity Score Matching and Survival Analysis.  
Different time intervals for reoffending for outcome variable were used and 
our results show that Community Resolution can have a reducing impact on 
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further offences committed by those offenders who received it. This holds 
when we split offenders to groups by their characteristics to check for 
heterogeneous effects with most groups showing lower recidivism rates after 
CR. We found that adults and employed offenders had lower reoffending rates 
when compared to unemployed and juvenile offenders and we also found that 
adult offenders had the largest average treatment effect of almost 19% after 
receiving CR as a police outcome. Also, our results from using Survival 
Analysis found offenders’ survival rate was about 68% for those who received 
CR and 57% for those offenders who did not. Or in other words, offenders 
who received CR survived without reoffending for longer than those who did 
not receive it. Overall, our findings suggest that CR can reduce reoffending 
rates for most types of offenders and for most type of offences that are eligible 
for such a resolution. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
The three chapters of this thesis analyse three research questions which all aim 
to understand what deters crime and ‘what works where’. 
In the first chapter, we try to contribute to an existing literature by analysing 
how the effectiveness of the justice system affects crime rates by analysing the 
impact of the swiftness of the justice system in addition to severity of 
punishment and certainty of detection. We find that detection plays an 
important role in reducing crime and that severity of sentencing has a more 
ambiguous effect and varies across crime types. We also find that swiftness of 
the justice system might have a different effect than existing theoretical 
thinking. For some crime types, there is no net impact and for others 
categories, less crimes could be committed whilst waiting for judicial 
proceedings if there is higher level of monitoring and, therefore, higher 
detection rate, whilst waiting.  
In the second chapter, we explore how effective non-custodial sentences can 
be in reducing crime rates. We find that for certain crime types alternatives to 
custody can be either superior or equivalent to a prison sentence in 
effectiveness. Prison sentences generally are much more costly than the 
alternatives and our results suggests that there is scope to combat crime 
through the criminal justice system in a more humane as well as cost effective 
way. 
In the third chapter, we use individual level data on low level offenders in 
Norfolk and Suffolk Police Force Areas and examine the effectiveness of a 
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particular type of alternative to custody, viz. Community Resolution on 
reoffending rates. We use different time intervals of reoffending rates as our 
outcome variable and our results show that Community Resolution has a 
reducing impact on recidivism. To our knowledge, it is the first study analysing 
the effectiveness of Community Resolution on recidivism outcomes.  
To conclude, across all three chapters we find that crime types differ in how 
they respond to changes in criminal justice practices whether it is a longer wait 
for the trial or to the type of sentence issued. Therefore, there is no single 
answer in how crime rates can be reduced but there is a further need to explore 
differences across crimes and offenders and the impact policing and criminal 
justice interventions have when trying to reduce total crime and reoffending 
rates. 
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A Is Justice delayed justice denied? Exploring the impact 
of sanction celerity on crime 
 
 
A.1 Time Trend for Burglary, Theft and Violence Against the Person 
Rates 
 
Figure 8 Time Trend for Burglary, Theft and Violence Against the Person Rates, 1994 - 2008 
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A.2 Fixed Effects Regression Models – No Celerity and No Severity  
 
Table 30: Fixed Effects Regression 
Model – No Celerity 
   
 
Theft Burglary VATP 
Certainty (t-1) -0.29*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.27*** 
(0.08) 
Severity (t-1) -0.07*** 
(0.03) 
-0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.29** 
(0.11) 
Youth  -0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.51* 
(0.3) 
-0.14 
(0.6) 
Population Density -0.45 
(0.38) 
-1.31** 
(0.54) 
0.48 
(0.79) 
Lower Quartile Earnings Ratio 0.06 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.37) 
0.51 
(0.37) 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
N 568 568 568 
R^2 (within) 0.7 0.82 0.85 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors are clustered at the PFA 
level. Coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. All 
variables in natural logarithm apart from the time trend. 
 
 
Table 31: Fixed Effects Regression 
Model – No Severity 
   
 
Theft Burglary VATP 
Certainty (t-1) -0.3*** 
(0.03) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.31*** 
(0.09) 
Celerity (t-1) 0.01 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.24** 
(0.06) 
Youth  -0.04 
(0.2) 
-0.28 
(0.39) 
-0.14 
(0.65) 
Population Density -0.38 
(0.39) 
-1.2* 
(0.63) 
0.63 
(0.79) 
Lower Quartile Earnings Ratio 0.07 
(0.16) 
0.77 
(0.54) 
0.46 
(0.35) 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
N 568 337 538 
R^2 (within) 0.7 0.85 0.85 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors are clustered at the PFA 
level. Coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. All 
variables in natural logarithm apart from the time trend. 
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A.3 Quadratic Model – number of days derivation  
 
𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 9.121 − 3.896𝑥 + 0.382𝑥
2 
where x is Waiting times for VATP 
Then taking derivatives: 
 
𝑑𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑑𝑥
=  −3.896 + 2 ∗ (0.382)𝑥 
𝑑𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑑𝑥
=  −3.896 + 0.764𝑥 
Now we can plug any value of waiting times into the derivative equation and 
it would give us the effect of waiting times on crime rate (for violence against 
the person). The point at which the effect of waiting time switches from 
positive to negative is the turning point and the effect of waiting time at this 
point will be zero as it transitions from negative to positive. We calculate the 
waiting time (in days) at which this happens by substituting zero for the slope: 
0 =  −3.896 + 0.764𝑥 
𝑥 =   
3.896
0.764
= 5.1 
Since everything is in natural logarithms, we get that: 
ln(𝑥) = 5.1 
𝑥 =  𝑒5.1  ~ 164  days 
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B  Alternatives to custody: evidence from police force 
areas in the United Kingdom 
 
B.1 Composition of Total Recorded Crime in England and Wales 2002 
- 2013 
 
Figure 9: Composition of Total Recorded Crime in England and Wales 2002 - 2013 
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B.2 Composition of Property Crime in England and Wales, 2002 – 
2013 
 
 
Figure 10: Composition of Property Crime in England and Wales, 2002 – 2013 
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B.3 Composition of Violent Crimes in England and Wales 2002 - 2013 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Composition of Violent Crimes in England and Wales 2002 - 2013 
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B.4 Conviction Rates for Violence Against the Person, Sex Offences, 
Robbery and Property Crime, England and Wales, 2002 – 2013 
 
 
Figure 12 Conviction rates for Violence Against the Person, Sex Offences, Robbery and 
Property Crime, England and Wales, 2002 – 2013 
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B.5 Fixed Effects Regression Models Predicting Change in Crime 
Rates, 2002–2013 
 
Table 32: Fixed Effects Regression Models, level results 
(not in elasticity form) 
VATP SexOff Robbery Property 
Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1) -0.29 
(0.24) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-7.07*** 
(1.49) 
Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1) -1.52*** 
(0.40) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-8.56** 
(3.46) 
Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1) -0.43 
(1.3) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
2.92 
(2.15) 
Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1) 0.77 
(1.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
5.79** 
(2.82) 
Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence (t-1) -0.55 
(0.40) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
5.74 
(6.13) 
Police Officers’ Salaries 0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.00004 
(0.0001) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Unemployment -0.26** 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-1.43*** 
(0.49) 
Youth 15 - 24 -0.23 
(0.26) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.1** 
(0.04) 
1.88** 
(0.93) 
Fixed Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 462 462 462 462 
R^2 (within) 0.71 0.4 0.51 0.9 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors 
are clustered at the PFA level (in parenthesis). Coefficients are significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. 
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B.6 Fixed Effects Regression Models  Predicting Change in Crime 
Rates with Adult and Juvenile Separate Specification, 2002–2013 
 
Table 31: Fixed Effects Regression Models, adult and 
juvenile separate specification, level results (not in elasticity 
form) 
VATP SexOff Robbery Property 
Adult Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1) 0.23 
(0.34) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
-8.26*** 
(2.49) 
Adult Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1) -1.26*** 
(0.39) 
-0.023*** 
(0.01) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
-7.53** 
(3.57) 
Adult Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1) -3.29** 
(-1.45) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
2.47 
(2.14) 
Adult Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1) -1.79* 
(1.06) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
6.12** 
(2.91) 
Adult Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence (t-1) -1.62*** 
(0.39) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
6.34 
(6.07) 
Juvenile Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1) -0.23 
(0.56) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02*** 
(0.009) 
-1.04 
(4.31) 
Juvenile Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1) -3.14* 
(1.66) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-26.17 
(24.66) 
Juvenile Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1)    -4.05 
(18.76) 
Juvenile Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1)    -72.47*** 
(26.82) 
Police Officers’ Salaries -0.0005 
(0.0007) 
-0.00008 
(0.00007) 
-0.00005 
(0.001) 
-0.03 
(0.005) 
Unemployment -0.26** 
(0.10) 
-0.013 
(0.01) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-1.41*** 
(0.48) 
Youth 15 - 24 -0.19 
(0.28) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
1.55* 
(0.77) 
Fixed Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 462 462 462 504 
R^2 (within) 0.74 0.4 0.51 0.9 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors 
are clustered at the PFA level (in parenthesis). Coefficients are significant at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. 
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B.7 Robustness section: Fixed Effects Regression Models Predicting 
Change in Crime Rates with Recession Interaction Dummies, 2002–
2013 
 
Table 33: Fixed effects regression models predicting change in 
crime rates with recession interaction dummies 
VATP SexOff Robb Property 
Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1) 0.06 
(0.45) 
-0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.08* 
(0.01) 
-0.22*** 
(2.66) 
Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1) -0.33*** 
(0.33) 
-0.12** 
(0.01) 
-0.39*** 
(0.01) 
-1.57 
(3.30) 
Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1) -0.03 
(1.26) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.68 
(3.49) 
Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1) -0.003 
(1.43) 
0.01* 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
-0.04 
(3.83) 
Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence (t-1) -0.1*** 
(0.38) 
-0.09*** 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.07*** 
(4.57) 
Police Officers’ Salaries 0.02 
(0.001) 
0.03 
(0.0001) 
0.03 
(0.0001) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Unemployment 0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.18** 
(0.01) 
0.33 
(0.04) 
0.002 
(0.51) 
Youth (15 – 24) 0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.53 
(0.03) 
0.58 
(0.03) 
0.4* 
(0.91) 
Recession Dummy ( > 2007) 6.06*** 
(1.86) 
0.36** 
(0.17) 
0.65* 
(0.39) 
30.16*** 
(10.90) 
Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1)*recession -0.06** 
(0.35) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.0002 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(2.68) 
Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1)*recession 0.11** 
(0.57) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.25*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(3.45) 
Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1)*recession 0.03** 
(1.37) 
-0.003 
(0.06) 
-0.0004 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(3.45) 
Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1)*recession 0.003 
(1.65) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.20) 
0.06** 
(4.15) 
Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence (t-1)*recession 0.06** 
(0.57) 
0.05** 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.1*** 
(6.79) 
Police Officers’ Salaries*recession -0.01 -0.004 -0.01 -0.01 
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(0.001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.004) 
Unemployment*recession -0.1*** 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.37*** 
(0.03) 
-0.06** 
(0.46) 
Youth (15 – 24)*recession -0.24*** 
(0.15) 
-0.27** 
(0.02) 
-0.22 
(0.04) 
-0.28*** 
(0.91) 
Time Trend -0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-3.46*** 
(0.33) 
Number of Observations 462 462 462 462 
R^2 (within) 0.73 0.30 0.60 0.91 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors 
are clustered at the PFA level (in parenthesis). Coefficients are significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. 
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B.8 Fixed Effects Regression Models Predicting Change in Crime 
Rates with Lagged Socio Economic Variables, 2002–2013 
 
Table 34: Fixed effects regression models 
predicting change in crime rates with lagged socio 
economic variables 
VATP SexOff Robbery Property 
Conviction Rate for Community Sentence (t-1) -0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.38 
(0.01) 
-0.11*** 
(0.01) 
-0.22*** 
(1.57) 
Conviction Rate for Custody (t-1) -0.21*** 
(0.39) 
-0.12*** 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.003) 
-0.14** 
(3.52) 
Conviction Rate for Conditional Discharge (t-1) -0.007 
(1.30) 
-0.02** 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(2.10) 
Conviction Rate for Fine (t-1) 0.01 
(1.00) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(2.75) 
Conviction Rate for Suspended Sentence (t-1) -0.55 
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.0003 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(6.50) 
Police Officers’ Salaries (t-1) 0.02 
(0.001) 
0.03 
(0.0001) 
-0.03 
(0.0002) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
Unemployment (t-1) -0.12** 
(0.10) 
-0.12** 
(0.01) 
-0.46** 
(0.03) 
-0.14*** 
(0.46) 
Youth 15 – 24 (t-1) 0.04 
(0.38) 
-0.13 
(0.03) 
2.18 
(0.10) 
0.34 
(1.24) 
Fixed Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 462 462 462 462 
R^2 (within) 0.71 0.40 0.52 0.90 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, robust standard errors 
are clustered at the PFA level (in parenthesis). Coefficients are significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively. 
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B.9 Robustness section – Empirical Specifications 
 
The empirical models for the cross crime effects of sentencing section are as 
follows: 
- For the violence against the person 
 
VATPRatei,t = β1CommunitySentSexOffi,t-1 + β2CustodySexOffi,t-1 + 
β3ConditionalDischargeSexOffi,t-1 + β4FineSexOffi,t-1 + β5SuspendedSentenceSexOffi,t-1 
+ β6ommunitySentRobberyi,t-1 + β7CustodyRobberyi,t-1 + 
β8ConditionalDischargeRobberyi,t-1 + β9FineRobberyi,t-1 + 
β10SuspendedSentenceRobberyi,t-1+ β11CommunitySentPropertyi,t-1 + β12CustodyPropertyi,t-
1 + β13ConditionalDischargePropertyi,t-1 + β14FinePropertyi,t-1 + 
β15SuspendedSentencePropertyi,t-1 + β16PoliceOfficersSalariesi,t + β17Unempli,t+ 
β18Youthi,t  + σi + µt + εi,t 
 
- For sex offences 
 
SexOffencesRatei,t = = β1CommunitySentVATPi,t-1 + β2CustodyVATPi,t-1 + 
β3ConditionalDischargeVATPi,t-1 + β4FineVATPi,t-1 + β5SuspendedSentenceVATPi,t-
1 + β61CommunitySentRobberyi,t-1 + β7CustodyRobberyi,t-1 + 
β8ConditionalDischargeRobberyi,t-1 + β9FineRobberyi,t-1 + 
β10SuspendedSentenceRobberyi,t-1 + β11CommunitySentPropertyi,t-1 + 
β12CustodyPropertyi,t-1 + β13ConditionalDischargePropertyi,t-1 + β14FinePropertyi,t-1 + 
β15SuspendedSentencePropertyi,t-1+ β16PoliceOfficersSalariesi,t + β17Unempli,t+ β18Youthi,t  
+ σi + µt + εi,t 
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- For robbery 
 
RobberyRatei,t = = β1CommunitySentVATPi,t-1 + β2CustodyVATPi,t-1 + 
β3ConditionalDischargeVATPi,t-1 + β4FineVATPi,t-1 + β5SuspendedSentenceVATPi,t-
1  + β6CommunitySentSexOffi,t-1 + β7CustodySexOffi,t-1 + 
β8ConditionalDischargeSexOffi,t-1 + β9FineSexOffi,t-1 + β10SuspendedSentenceSexOffi,t-1 
+  β11CommunitySentPropertyi,t-1 + β12CustodyPropertyi,t-1 + 
β13ConditionalDischargePropertyi,t-1 + β14FinePropertyi,t-1 + 
β15SuspendedSentencePropertyi,t-1+ β16PoliceOfficersSalariesi,t + β17Unempli,t+ β18Youthi,t  
+ σi + µt + εi,t 
- For property crime 
 
PropertyCrimeRatei,t == β1CommunitySentVATPi,t-1 + β2CustodyVATPi,t-1 + 
β3ConditionalDischargeVATPi,t-1 + β4FineVATPi,t-1 + β5SuspendedSentenceVATPi,t-
1  + β6CommunitySentSexOffi,t-1 + β7CustodySexOffi,t-1 + 
β83ConditionalDischargeSexOffi,t-1 + β9FineSexOffi,t-1 + β10SuspendedSentenceSexOffi,t-
1 +  β111CommunitySentRobberyi,t-1 + β12CustodyRobberyi,t-1 + 
β13ConditionalDischargeRobberyi,t-1 + β14FineRobberyi,t-1 + 
β15SuspendedSentenceRobberyi,t-1+ β16PoliceOfficersSalariesi,t + β17Unempli,t+ β18Youthi,t  
+ σi + µt + εi,t 
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B.10 Fixed Effects Regression Models Predicting Change in Crime 
Rates with Cross Crime Sentencing, 2002–2013 
 
Table 35: Fixed Effects Regression Models, Cross Crime 
Specification 
VATP Sex 
Offences 
Robbery Property 
Crime 
     
VATP - Community Sentence (t-1)  -0.09 -0.08 -0.01 
VATP - Custody (t-1)  -0.1 -0.11 -0.12*** 
VATP - Conditional Discharge (t-1)  0.02 0.06 0.001 
VATP - Fine (t-1)  -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
VATP - Suspended Sentence (t-1)  0.06*** 0.09 -0.01 
     
Sex Offences - Community Sentence (t-1) -0.19  -0.09* -0.02 
Sex Offences - Custody (t-1) -0.06*  0.01 -0.01 
Sex Offences - Conditional Discharge (t-1) -0.01  -0.03* -0.004 
Sex Offences - Fine (t-1) 0.01  -0.01 0.001 
Sex Offences - Suspended Sentence (t-1) -0.03***  0.01 -0.02** 
     
Robbery - Community Sentence (t-1) -0.01 -0.04*  -0.02** 
Robbery - Custody (t-1) -0.002 0.02  -0.01 
Robbery - Conditional Discharge (t-1) -0.01 -0.01  0.0002 
Robbery - Fine (t-1) -0.003 -0.003  0.0003 
Robbery - Suspended Sentence (t-1) 0.01 -0.01  0.01* 
     
Property Crime - Community Sentence (t-1) -0.02 0.03 -0.04**  
Property Crime - Custody (t-1) -0.02 0.07 -0.1  
Property Crime - Conditional Discharge (t-1) -0.06 0.01 0.27***  
Property Crime - Fine (t-1) 0.07* -0.002 0.22**  
Property Crime - Suspended Sentence (t-1) 0.01 -0.1** -0.13  
     
Police Officers’ Salaries 0.002 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Unemployment -0.15** -0.06 -0.27* -0.2*** 
Youth 15 – 24 -0.22 -0.4 1.17** 0.38** 
Fixed Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 462 462 462 462 
R^2 (within) 0.68 0.4 0.55 0.9 
Note: dependent variable is the crime rate per 1000 people. Coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, *** respectively 
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C Does Community Resolution reduce reoffending?  
 
C.1 Causal Treatment Effect Estimation  
 
To formalise the approach to causal treatment effect estimation, Apel and 
Sweeten (2010) start by assuming that all individuals in the target population 
have information on 𝑌𝑖
1 (potential outcome if treatment is received), 
𝑌𝑖
0(potential outcome if no treatment is received) and 𝑇𝑖 (whether or not 
treatment was received usually taking the values of 0 and 1, with 0 indicating 
no treatment and 1 indicting treatment taking place). With this information in 
mind, for each individual i, the causal effect of treatment is 𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0. Then the 
average treatment effect (ATE) is the expected effect of treatment on a 
randomly selected individual from the target population and is defined as: 
ATE = E(𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0) = E(𝑌𝑖
1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0) 
Also, it can be written as a function of the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) and average treatment effect of untreated (ATU). ATT is the 
expected effect of the treatment for those individuals in the target population 
who received the treatment and is defined as: 
ATT = E(𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0|𝑇𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
1| 𝑇𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0 | 𝑇𝑖 = 1) 
ATU is defined as the expected effect of treatment for those individuals who 
did not receive a treatment and is written as: 
ATU = E(𝑌𝑖
1 – 𝑌𝑖
0|𝑇𝑖 = 0) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
1| 𝑇𝑖 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0 | 𝑇𝑖 = 0) 
Then ATE can be rewritten as a weighted average of ATT and ATU: 
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E(𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0) = Pr(𝑇𝑖 = 1) E(𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0|𝑇𝑖 = 1) + Pr(𝑇𝑖 = 0) E(𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0|𝑇𝑖 =
0)               (1) 
Where Pr(𝑇𝑖 = 1) E(𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0|𝑇𝑖 = 1) is ATT weighted by the probability 
that treatment is received and Pr(𝑇𝑖 = 0) E(𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0|𝑇𝑖 = 0) is ATU 
weighted by the probability that treatment is not received. 
The obvious problem for causal estimation in this case is that only one of the 
two potential outcomes is observed for all individuals. Yi represents the 
observed outcome and can be defined as: 
Yi =  {
𝑌𝑖
1if 𝑇𝑖 = 1  
𝑌𝑖
0𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑖 = 0  
 
This framework shows that treatment effect estimation presents a missing 
data problem. It can be illustrated by decomposing ATE in terms of the 
known factuals and unknown counterfactuals. Inserting ATT and ATU 
equations in our last ATE equation (1) we get: 
E(𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0) = Pr(𝑇𝑖 = 1) [𝐸(𝑌𝑖
1| 𝑇𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0 | 𝑇𝑖 = 1)] + Pr(𝑇𝑖 = 0) 
[𝐸(𝑌𝑖
1| 𝑇𝑖 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0 | 𝑇𝑖 = 0)] 
The unknown counterfactuals are 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0 | 𝑇𝑖 = 1) which is the potential 
outcome if no treatment is received in the treated sample and 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
1| 𝑇𝑖 = 0) 
which is the potential outcome of the treatment in untreated sample. 
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C.2 Characteristics of the Offenders for age, employment status, 
ethnicity and gender distributions, 2010 – 2014, Norfolk and Suffolk 
Police 
 
Figure 13: Characteristics of the Offenders for age, employment status, ethnicity and 
gender distributions, 2010 – 2014, Norfolk and Suffolk Police 
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C.3 Descriptive Statistics – Male Only Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34: Descriptive Statistics, Male Only Sample 
   
Descriptive 
Statistics                 
Male Only Sample                 
Variable   Description             
                 
Reoffending  
Police record of one more arrest after committing first 
offence (0 = no, 1 = yes)       
Treatment  
Receiving Community Resolution as police 
outcome (0 = no, 1 = yes)        
                 
         Mean               
       Unmatched   Matched       
              
t-
test   
       Treated Control  Treated Control 
%bias 
reduction %bias t p>|t| 
Sociodemographic                
Ethnicity  
0 = White, 1 = 
Non-White  0.06 0.08  0.06 0.04 46.5 4.3 0.75 0.46 
Age at the first 
offence 
Age at 
admission   23.9 29.2  23.9 23.8 99 0.4 0.06 0.95 
Employment  
0 = unemployed, 
1 = employed 0.61 0.63  0.61 0.58 -23.62 5.7 0.86 0.39 
                 
Current crime               
Assault  
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.24 0.2  0.24 0.23 78.5 2.1 0.31 0.76 
Criminal Damage 
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.15 0.09  0.15 0.14 80.3 3.9 0.55 0.58 
Theft  
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.29 0.17  0.29 0.3 96.5 -1 
-
0.14 0.89 
Harassment   
0 = no, 1 = 
yes     0.09 0.06   0.09 0.09 87 -1.6 
-
0.23 0.82 
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C.4 Descriptive Statistics – Employed Only Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 36: Descriptive Statistics – Employed Only Sample 
      
Descriptive Statistics                 
Employed Only Sample                 
Variable   Description             
                 
Reoffending  
Police record of one more arrest after committing first 
offence (0 = no, 1 = yes)       
Treatment  
Receiving Community Resolution as police 
outcome (0 = no, 1 = yes)        
                 
         Mean               
       Unmatched   Matched       
              
t-
test   
       Treated Control  Treated Control 
%bias 
reduction %bias t p>|t| 
Sociodemographic                
Ethnicity  
0 = White, 1 = 
Non-White  0.06 0.07  0.06 0.05 -1.5 2.2 0.32 0.75 
Age at the first offence 
Age at 
admission   22.3 28.7  22.3 22.53 99.3 0.3 0.05 0.96 
Gender  
0 = Male, 1 = 
Female  0.23 0.14  0.23 0.22 96.9 0.7 0.09 0.93 
                 
Current crime               
Assault  
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.29 0.24  0.29 0.31 80.9 -2.5 
-
0.32 0.75 
Criminal Damage 
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.16 0.09  0.16 0.16 95.8 0.8 0.1 0.92 
Theft  
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.23 0.17  0.23 0.22 85.1 2.1 0.27 0.79 
Harassment   
0 = no, 1 = 
yes     0.1 0.06   0.1 0.1 75.5 -3 
-
0.37 0.71 
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C.5 Descriptive Statistics – Unemployed Only Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 37: Descriptive Statistics – Unemployed Only Sample 
          
Descriptive 
Statistics                 
Unemployed Only 
Sample                 
Variable   Description             
                 
Reoffending  
Police record of one more arrest after committing first 
offence (0 = no, 1 = yes)       
Treatment  
Receiving Community Resolution as police 
outcome (0 = no, 1 = yes)        
                 
         Mean               
       Unmatched   Matched       
              
t-
test   
       Treated Control  Treated Control 
%bias 
reduction %bias t p>|t| 
Sociodemographic                
Ethnicity  
0 = White, 1 
= Non-White  0.03 0.08  0.03 0.02 91.8 1.8 0.28 0.78 
Age at the first 
offence 
Age at 
admission   27.2 30.5  27.2 27.4 92.8 -2 
-
0.23 0.82 
Gender  
0 = Male, 1 = 
Female  0.27 0.18  0.27 0.29 83.4 -3.8 -0.4 0.69 
                 
Current crime               
Assault  
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.21 0.15  0.21 0.2 86.9 2.1 0.22 0.83 
Criminal Damage 
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.09 0.07  0.09 0.09 85.8 1.4 0.15 0.88 
Theft  
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.38 0.22  0.38 0.4 87.6 -4.4 
-
0.45 0.65 
Harassment   
0 = no, 1 = 
yes     0.09 0.06   0.09 0.08 61.1 4.6 0.49 0.62 
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C.6 Descriptive Statistics –Juvenile Only Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38: Descriptive Statistics –Juvenile Only Sample 
   
Descriptive 
Statistics                 
Juvenile Only 
Sample                 
Variable   Description             
                 
Reoffending  
Police record of one more arrest after committing first 
offence (0 = no, 1 = yes)       
Treatment  
Receiving Community Resolution as police 
outcome (0 = no, 1 = yes)        
                 
         Mean               
       Unmatched   Matched       
              
t-
test   
       Treated Control  Treated Control 
%bias 
reduction %bias t p>|t| 
Sociodemographic                
Ethnicity  
0 = White, 1 = 
Non-White  0.06 0.08  0.06 0.06 100 0 0 1 
Employment  
0 = Unemployed, 
1 = Employed 0.76 0.77  0.76 0.76 100 0 0 1 
Gender  
0 = Male, 1 = 
Female  0.23 0.18  0.23 0.21 62.9 4.7 0.52 0.602 
                 
Current crime               
Assault  
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.27 0.26  0.27 0.3 -84.5 -5.1 
-
0.57 0.57 
Criminal Damage 
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.18 0.17  0.18 0.17 19.4 1 0.11 0.91 
Theft  
0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.22 0.18  0.22 0.22 100 0 0 1 
Harassment   
0 = no, 1 = 
yes     0.06 0.04   0.06 0.06 100 0 0 1 
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C.7 Descriptive Statistics –Adult Only Sample 
 
 
Table 39: Descriptive Statistics –Adult Only Sample 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
 
                
Adult Only 
Sample 
 
                
Variable   
 
Description             
   
 
              
Reoffending  
 Police record of one more arrest after committing first 
offence (0 = no, 1 = yes)       
Treatment  
 Receiving Community Resolution as police 
outcome (0 = no, 1 = yes)        
   
 
              
   
 
      Mean               
   
 
    Unmatched   Matched       
   
 
           
t-
test   
   
 
    Treated Control  Treated Control 
%bias 
reduction %bias t p>|t| 
Sociodemographic                 
Ethnicity  
 0 = White, 1 = 
Non-White  0.04 0.07  0.04 0.04 100 0 0 1 
Employment  
 0 = Unemployed, 
1 = Employed 0.46 0.59  0.46 0.46 100 0 0 1 
Gender  
 0 = Male, 1 = 
Female  0.26 0.26  0.15 0.26 100 0 0 1 
   
 
              
Current crime                
Assault  
 0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.25 0.19  0.25 0.25 100 0 0 1 
Criminal 
Damage 
 0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.1 0.07  0.1 0.1 100 0 0 1 
Theft  
 0 = no,  1 
= yes   0.034 0.19  0.34 0.34 100 0 0 1 
Harassment   
 0 = no, 1 = 
yes     0.12 0.06   0.12 0.12 100 0 0 1 
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C.8 Descriptive Statistics –Assault Offences Only Sample 
 
 
Table 40: Descriptive Statistics –Assault Offences Only 
Sample 
              
Descriptive 
Statistics                 
Assault Only                   
Variable   Description             
                 
Reoffending  
Police record of one more arrest after committing first 
offence (0 = no, 1 = yes)       
Treatment  
Receiving Community Resolution as police 
outcome (0 = no, 1 = yes)        
                 
         Mean               
       Unmatched   Matched       
              
t-
test   
       Treated Control  Treated Control 
%bias 
reduction %bias t p>|t| 
Sociodemographic                
Ethnicity  
0 = White, 1 = 
Non-White  0.06 0.06  0.06 0.05 -32.9 2.6 0.25 0.804 
Employment  
0 = Unemployed, 
1 = Employed 0.67 0.72  0.67 0.68 87.41 -1.3 
-
0.12 0.91 
Gender  
0 = Male, 1 = 
Female  0.3 0.17  0.3 0.3 95.4 1.5 0.12 0.9 
Age at the first 
offence 
Age at 
admission     23.1 29.5   23.1 232.9 97.1 1.5 0.14 0.89 
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C.9 Descriptive Statistics –Theft Offences Only Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 41: Descriptive Statistics –Theft Offences Only Sample 
            
Descriptive Statistics                 
Theft Only                   
Variable   Description             
                 
Reoffending  
Police record of one more arrest after committing first 
offence (0 = no, 1 = yes)       
Treatment  
Receiving Community Resolution as police 
outcome (0 = no, 1 = yes)        
                 
         Mean               
       Unmatched   Matched       
              
t-
test   
       Treated Control  Treated Control 
%bias 
reduction %bias t p>|t| 
Sociodemographic                
Ethnicity  
0 = White, 1 
= Non-White  0.03 0.05  0.03 0.04 33.4 -8.5 
-
0.85 0.4 
Employment  
0 = Unemployed, 
1 = Employed 0.46 0.55  0.46 0.46 94 1.1 0.11 0.92 
Gender  
0 = Male, 1 = 
Female  0.24 0.24  0.24 0.2 -2159.1 9.1 0.89 0.37 
Age at the first 
offence 
Age at 
admission     27.1 30   27.1 26.6 83.1 3.7 0.33 0.74 
